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THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION, 
YUGOSlAVIA, AND THE 
(DIS)INTEGRATION OF THE EU, THE NEW 
SICK MAN OF EUROPE 
\\'ILLIAM BRADFORD* 
Abstract: This Article examines the historical evolution of the 
Western European Union (WEU) within the context of its 
relationship to NATO and to the European Union (EU) in 
order to explain Europe's failure to devise and implement 
collective security measures during the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia. This Article concludes that, under the limitations of 
its present legal and political framework, the WEU is not a 
realistic alternative to NATO in the "post-post-Cold War era" 
and that continued failure to craft a European defense identity 
and to meld it to effective European security institutions will 
prevent the EU from generating cohesive force in 
international relations and, ultimately, will threaten the project 
of European integration. 
INTRODUCTION 
Europe has never existed. It is not the addition of national sovereignties in 
conclave which creates an entity. One must genuinel), create Europe. 
-Jean lVIonnet 
The end of the Cold War triggered a remarkable surge in opti-
mism about the future of international relations, with many scholars 
postulating that collective interventions under the aegis of the United 
Nations (UN) or regional organizations would be sufficient to root 
out any remaining sources of global instability. However, no sooner 
was the existential Soviet threat reduced, and with it the raison d'etre 
for the collective defense of Western Europe, than ethno-
hypernationalism, religious hatred, territorial revanchism, and other 
* LL.M. Candidate, Harvard La\\' School. Ph.D .. Northwestern Unin:rsity, 1995; J.D .• 
University of Miami School of Law. 2000. I am grateful to Professors David Abraham and 
Carl McKenry of the University of Miami School of Law for their guidance and encour-
agement. 
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traditional sources of disorder surged to the fore. Deprived of a 
common enemy and fully sovereign at long last, Western European 
states abandoned tepid attachments to bloc discipline, addressed na-
tional economic and social problems, 1 and advanced the process of 
European supranational organization. Although the EU had been 
successful in fostering transnational cooperation through the expan-
sion of commerce, the preoccupation of its Member States with inter-
nal affairs, predicated upon a facile assumption that domestic issues 
and security are divisible, calls into question the very character, cohe-
siveness, and feasibility of a united Europe.2 
The fall of Yugoslavia shattered visions of a "New World Order" 
and cast a "long dark shadow" over the entire European continent.3 
While Western Europe had ample collective military capacity and a 
sufficiently compelling moral imperative to intervene early in the wars 
of secession,4 and while it is in the European interest to assume re-
sponsibility for the security of its own continent,S the failure of the EU 
to fulfill either function suggests that development of an independent 
European security architecture is fundamentally too immature to con-
tain the spillover effects of ethno-nationalist conflicts in the near-
abroad.6 If the EU intends to assume the trappings of sovereignty, it 
must develop a coherent defense identity and defense institutions to 
orchestrate the management of contingencies such as Yugoslavia. 
Otherwise, the responsibility for security in the European sphere will 
remain the province of an increasingly noncommittal U.S. Thus, the 
failure of Western Europeans to develop a European security and de-
fense identity (ESDI) is an obstacle on the royal road not only to 
European integration but, more importantly, to international order 
and justice. 
An independent ESDI requires for its construction a significant 
degree of political cohesion that the EU Member States have been 
unable or unwilling to fashion. Although the Treaty on European Un-
ion (TEU) was expected to push the EU to define, implement, and 
1 See Yutiy Borko, Possible Scenarios for Geopolitical Shifts in Russian-Ellropean Relations, in 
GEOPOLITICS IN POST-WALL EUROPE 196, 197 (Ola Tunander et a!. eds., 1997). 
2 R. J. Barry Jones, The Economic Agenda, in INTERNATIONAL POLITICS IN EUROPE: THE 
NEW AGENDA 87,108 (G. Wyn Rees ed., 1993). 
3 CHRISTOPHER BENNETT, YUGOSLAVIA'S BLOODY COLLAPSE I (1995). 
4 SeeW.F. VAN EEKELEN, DEBATING EUROPEAN SECURITY, 1948-1998, at 142 (1998). 
5 BARBARA CONRY, CUO INSTITUTE, POLICY ANALYSIS No. 239, THE WESTERN EURO-
PEAN UNION AS NATO's SUCCESSOR 8 (1995). 
6 GAZMEN XHUDO, DIPLOMACY AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN THE BALKANS: A U.S. 
FOREIGN POLICY PERSPECTI\'E 120 (1996). 
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unreservedly support a common European foreign and security pol-
icy, when progress toward political union collapsed, it was not surpris-
ing that the first casualty of the wars of Yugoslav secession was the du-
tifully nurtured myth of European unity. 7 
Absent coordination of Member States' foreign policies, the EU 
cannot attain the political union necessary to increase its influence in 
international relations.s However, in order to achieve political union, 
factual attributes of sovereignty must be mingled voluntarily and na-
tional securities subordinated to a larger regional security entity.9 The 
EU, internally riven by intractable political conflicts, is less a cohesion-
generating institution that transfers sovereignty to a higher level of 
political organization than a "network that involves the pooling and 
sharing of sovereignty," the control of which "rests with the national 
governments acting collectively."lo Consequently, although the mili-
tary rivalry among them is consigned to the dustbin of history, in lieu 
of a common security dilemma, the stubborn and myopic refusal of 
EU Member States to abandon distinct national military traditions 
and defense styles in favor of supranational defense institutions and 
philosophies stymies any attempt to devise functional options other 
than continued dependence on the U.S. and NATO.ll Prior to the fall 
of Yugoslavia, this refusal was not perceived on either side of the At-
lantic as detrimental either to the process of European integration or 
to the establishment of post-Cold War order. Presently, however, the 
EU is so bound to the U.S.-dominated defense regime and so inter-
nally divided that serious questions exist as to whether it ever can be-
come more than a trading club, casually daydreaming about military 
illdependencel2 but incapable of policing its own territory, let alone 
providing for the security of the most vicious neighborhoods of 
Europe. 
While condemnation of 'Western Europeans for failing to provide 
for their own security is somewhat unfair because NATO has not so 
subtly preempted attempts to establish an independent Western ESDI, 
an era of profound change is settling upon Europe in the aftermath 
7 JOliN NE\\'1I0USE, EUROPE ADRIFT 84 (1997). 
8 Set' BaITY Buzan, The Future of n't>stern ElIr(tjJean Seollity, ill EUROPEAN POLYPHONY: 
PERSPECTI\'ES BEYOND EAST-WEST CONFRONTATION Hi, 19 (Ole Waever et aI., eds. 1989). 
9/d. 
10 Ole Waever, Identity, Integratioll and Serurity: Solving the Sovereignty Puzzle ill E. [T. Stlld-
ies, 48 J. INT'L AFF. 389,426 (Win tel' 1995). 
11 See Buzan, supra note 8, at 33. 
12 ""alter Goldstein, EurojJe Beyond the Tum of the Centlll)': The Limits of Economic And Se-
curity Choices, in THE COLD WAR LEGACY IN EUROPE 121, 136 (Otto Pick ed., 1992). 
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of the Balkan holocaust. Traces of Yalta, Potsdam, and other early 
chapters of the Cold War have reemerged in Southeastern Europe, 
and Western Europeans are being forced to reconsider who they are 
and what they might become in an era in which all that is certain is 
that future Bosnias will "be like buses"-"there will always be another 
coming down the street. "13 As defense budgets dwindle, deficits bur-
geon, and peace dividends burn away in the domestic political ether, 
the U.S. will scrutinize intensely the wisdom of maintaining NATO as 
the primary European security institution. Although Bosnia and 
Kosovo have made it impossible to conceive of peace enforcement or 
humanitarian intervention in Europe without a central role for the 
U.S.,14 and despite the development of a pan-European notion of en-
titlement to U.S. troops,15 NATO is expensive and risks drawing the 
U.S. into military conflicts even when no vital U.S. interests are clearly 
jeopardized. Moreover, Bosnia demonstrates that, despite its military 
capacity, the U.S. lacks the political will to positively shape the pre-
carious, sui generis transition to post-Communism in Eastern Europe. 
While replacing NATO with a separatist security institution might 
prove hazardous for the security of Western Europe, the U.S. has 
demonstrated the interest if not the leadership, and the EU the inten-
tion if not the capacity, to do so. The failure'of the UN in Yugoslavia 
and the erosion of NATO's reliability have underscored the hoary tnl-
ism that the principle attribute of states-military power-is still the 
most convertible currency in international relations. 16 Although en-
dowing the EU with the inherent qualities of a state capable of engag-
ing in international relations on par with other states may necessitate 
alteration of the EU legal and political order,17 an independent de-
fense capability is sine qua non if the EU is to assume responsibility for 
its own security. 
13 Christopher Layne, Minding Ollr OWII Bllsiness: The Case for AlIlelican Non-participation 
in International PeacekeejJing/Peacelllakillg Operatioll, ill BEYOND TRADITIONAL PEACEKEEPING 
85,90 (Donald c.F. Daniel & Bradd C. Hayes eds., 1995). 
14 See Richard M. Connaughton, EllrojJeall Olgallhatiolls {lJi(IIlItenl('lItioll, ill PLI.CE SuP-
PORT OPERATIONS AND THE U.S. MILITARY 185, 19:~ (DennisJ Quinn cd .. 1994). 
15 JUSTIN R>l.IMONDO, INTO THE BOSNIAN QUAGMIRE: THE C>l.SE ,\C;,\INST U.S. INTER-
\'ENTION IN THE BALKANS 27 (l 99G). 
16 See Dayid F. \Valsh. The Illternatiollal S)'SIt'11i ill Tmllsitioll: The ,Ve1lli:'lIvirolllllellt ofFOIc 
eigll Policy, in Al\fERICA IN THE 21ST CENTURY: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN FOR-
EIGN POLICY 11, ,~O (Kul B. Rai et al. eds., 1997). 
17 See Barbara Crutchfield George. et aI., The Dilelllma of the EllrDjlean Uilion: Balancing 
the Power of the SUj)),{lfllltiollal Elf Entity Agaillst the Sovereignty of Its Independent j\!J.elllber Natiolls, 
9 PACE Iwr'L L. RE\,. 111, 117 (1997). 
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Nonetheless, the disparity between expectations and reality for 
the V\r:U, the heir apparent to NATO, is tremendous. The WEU has 
failed to articulate even a limited commOll European role in combat-
ing lawlessness or upholding evell minimal humanitarian standards in 
"gray zone" conflicts such as Kosovo, let alolle the broader and 
infinitely more complex mission of the cOlltinental defense of 
Europe. In addition, institutional rivalries between the WEU and 
NATO, as well as intra-European rivalries, prevent the emergence of a 
common defense philosophy, a prerequisite to the generation of a 
functional supranational European defense organization. IS Given its 
storied record of incompetence and incoherence, the WEU is beset 
with calls for its dissolution or its legal subordination to NATO. Given 
the importance of an independent European defense institution to 
the project of European integration and rapprochement with Russia, 
however, other more temperate and more optimistic voices seek to 
reinvigorate the vVEU by way of incorporation within a revamped le-
gal and political EU framework. vVhile the European movement is a 
"creature of crisis," drawing inspiration from the Cold War, the Suez 
Crisis, the oil embargoes of the 1970s, and the turbulence of the 
1980s,I9 the EU, built upon the underlying idea that the nations of 
Western Europe belong together and should stay together, is jeopard-
ized by the Balkan tragedies: Europe itself may be disintegrating over 
Yugoslavia. 
This Article (1) examines the "VEU within the context of its rela-
tionship to the EU and NATO in order to provide theoretical expla-
nations for the failure of the EU to devise and implement collective 
security measures in the Yugoslav wars of secession; and (2) deter-
mines whether the WEU represents a realistic alternative to the trans-
Atlantic security framework of NATO or, alternatively, whether absent 
U.S. hegemonic control of European security, the EU can generate 
the cohesive force in international relations necessary to prevent frat-
ricidal, demoralizing, and destabilizing conflicts from erupting within 
a European sphere of influence and threatening the European inte-
grative project. 
18 SI'I' TIMOTHY J. BIRCH, DEFENSE COOPERATION IN WESTERN EUROPE: THE POST-
MAASTRICHT ERA AND BEYOND 2 (1997). 
19 NE,nIOUSE, sllpra note 7, at 15. 
18 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 24:13 
1. THE MATURATION OF THE "'VEU: THE FALL OF THE BERLIN WALL TO 
THE GULF WAR, 1989-1991 
A. The End of the Cold War 
With the dramatic fall of the Berlin Wall and the commencement 
of the Soviet retreat from Eastern Europe in October 1989, the ra-
tionale for the shared trans-Atlantic security imperative and the main-
tenance of the Cold War web of political and economic arrangements 
diminished overnight.20 The U.S. addressed the welcome if discon-
certing turn in international relations with nebulous calls for some 
form of pan-European security architecture predicated upon an over-
lap of NATO and European institutions that would create trans-
Atlantic and East-West synergy.21 However, the decline of Alliance co-
hesion, as well as the evaporation of the constraints imposed by main-
taining a common defense,22 convinced euphoric Western European 
politicians that, in the so-called "post-Cold War era," specific national 
economic interests need not be sacrificed any longer for the sake of 
preserving broader security ties through military expenditures.23 In 
the fall of 1989, Western Europeans of all political persuasions pushed 
questions of security and Alliance politics aside in order to concen-
trate their energies on reaping economic gains through conversion of 
military resources to the civilian sector and erection of a "common 
European home" with increased commercial linkages to the East.24 
The U.S. then found itself faced with the choice of preserving 
U.S. hegemony in Europe or permitting a pluralist balance of power 
with a much more limited U.S. role. While proponents of a status quo 
trans-Atlantic security community contended that mutual trans-
Atlantic interests remained unchanged, others suggested that the U.S. 
had "done its part for democracy, politics, and liberty in Europe" and 
that, in the post-Cold War multipolar environment, maintaining the 
20 See David P. Calleo, Rebalancing the U.S.-European-Soviet Triangle, ill EUROPE AND 
AMERICA BEYOND 2000, at 36, 39 (Gregory F. Treverton ed., 1990). 
21 Alexander Moens & Christopher Anstis, Preface ALEXNDER MOENS ET AI.., DISCON-
CERTED EUROPE: THE SEARCH FOR A NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE i, ix (Alexnder Moens 
& Christopher Anstis eds., 1994). 
22 Pierre Hassner, The PIiOlity of COllstructing Western Europe, in EUROPE AND AMERICA 
BEYOND 2000, sujna note 20, at 18, 23. 
23 Gregory F. Treverton, Illtroduction: Looking Beyond 2000, in EUROPE AND AMERICA 
BEYOND 2000, supra note 20, at 1,9. 
2~ Bassner, slljna note 22, at :~ 1. 
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Atlantic Alliance was no longer possible or necessary.25 This latter po-
sition gathered support as 1989 progressed.26 
Without the Cold War, there simply was no obvious and compel-
ling imperative for close U.S.-Western European security and defense 
cooperation.27 Thus, by the end of the year, the U.S. proposed to spur 
Western European nations into assuming primary responsibility for 
their own defense, thereby rectifying the free-riding problem the U.S. 
identified as the source of much of its fiscal deficits. 28 This strategy of 
"limited liability" directed that, if the U.S. were to participate in 
NATO operations, particularly those located out-of-area, it would em-
ploy principally naval assets and shift the primary ground-force obli-
gation to Western Europe.29 At the same time, the U.S. considered 
drastically reducing its forces in Europe in order to pay for extended 
deterrence and the development of fast sea and air-lift capacities with 
which to defend the Atlantic Alliance should it prove to be in its nar-
rowly-tailored interests to do so. When Western Europeans countered 
that NATO obliged them merely to check immediate threats to the 
territorial integrity and security of the treaty-area but not to protect 
U.S.-defined interests external to their textual commitment, the im-
age of the trans-Atlantic policy environment of September 1989 was 
drawn into sharp focus: with both pillars of the Alliance turned in-
ward upon themselves and Central and Eastern Europe cut adrift 
from their Cold War moorings, it was perhaps foreordained that the 
Yugoslav request for U.S. aid to salvage its decaying political economy 
and prevent disintegration of its constituent republics would be flatly 
rebuffed with the terse but definitive pronouncement that NATO, in 
the post-Cold War era, would not become involved in "out of area" 
commitments,30 particularly those m areas of no strategic 
25 See Dennis L. Bark, The A lIIelican-EII IOjJM II Relationshij)." Reflertiolls on Half a Centlll)'. in 
REFLECTIONS ON EUROPE 1. 7 (Dennis L. Bark ed .• 1997). 
26 SeeCalleo. sllpra note 20, at 44. 
27 Charles Krupnick, ElllOjJMn Secwit)' and Defense COlfjieration DlI1ing the CoM H'tIr, ill 
DISCONCERTED EUROPE: THE SEARCH FOR A NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE, wpm note 21. 
at 3, 20. 
28 ALFRED CAHEN, THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION AND NATO: BUILDING A EUROPEAN 
IDENTITY WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF ATLANTIC SOLIDARITY 22 (1990). 
29 Layne, sll/}1'a note 13, at 95. 
30 Susan L. v,'ouc\ward, Redrawing Borders in a Pedor! oJ S1'stell/ir Transition, ill INTERNA-
TIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND ETHNIC CONFLICT 198, 209 (Milton J. Esman & Shibley TeI-
hani e<ls., 1995). 
20 Boston College International & COlllparative Law Review [Vol. 24:13 
significance.31 Quietly, Yugoslavia began the long slow descent into 
barbarity, the extent and depth of which were difficult to foresee. 
B. U.S.-EC Transatlantic Declaration 
With collective European security at the crossroads, the 1990s 
dawned to find the Soviet Union in full retreat, German reunification 
proceeding apace, and vocal doubts about the continuing U.S. pres-
ence in Europe echoing across the continent. However, while Euro-
pean WEU members France and Germany continued efforts to de-
velop within the European Community (EC) a Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) to govern the WEU-coordinated ESDI,32 the 
mainstream Western European position on ESDI tabbed a reformed 
Alliance as the optimal arrangement.33 The WEU, faced yet again with 
having to choose between playing the traditional role of promoting 
Atlantic solidarity or becoming a key participant in the process of 
European integration,34 vaguely charted the middle course by making 
its activities transparent and accessible to those members of the EC 
not yet members of the WEU in the hopes of broadening member-
ship and functionality while ensuring compatibility with as yet unde-
tennined NATO objectives.35 Thus, with its single largest challenge 
the development of a new consensus in the post-containment era, 
NATO, as well as every other European interlocking security institu-
tion including the WEU and the Conference on Security and Coop-
eration in Europe (CSCE) ,36 an organization consisting of members 
of both the Warsaw Pact and NATO and chartered to manage the su-
perpower confrontation, foster detente and democracy, stimulate 
trade, and monitor human rights,37 stood rooted at the sidelines in 
paralysis as nationalists swept every Yugoslav republican election, 
armed skirmishes erupted in ethnic Serb towns in Croatia, and 
authorities from Slovenia and Croatia launched a strident campaign 
in Western capitals in support of recognition as independent states. 
31 See Susan L. V\'oodward, Illtemational Aspects of the Wan ill Fm71ler Yugoslavia, in BURN 
THIS HOUSE: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF YUGOSLWIA 215, 216 (jasminka Udovicki & 
J ames Ridgeway eels., 1997). 
32 Kenneth CHRISTIE, PROBLEMS IN EUROPEAN POLITICS 223 (1995). 
33 DESMOND DINAN, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 218 (1998). 
34 C. \\lYNN REES, THE \VESTERN EUROPEAN UNION AT THE CROSSROADS: BETWEEN 
TRANS-ATL\NTIC SOLIDARITY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION ix (1998). 
35 See CAHEN, supra note 28, at 25. 
36 Connaughton, supra note 14, at 189. 
37 Michael Brenner, America s EurojJeall Role, in THE COLD V\'AR LEGACY IN EUROPE, su-
jJra note 12, at 44,57. 
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C. The Gulf War: The First Out-of Area Crisis 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 and the subse-
quent U.S. deployment offorces to Saudi Arabia triggered a profound 
re-examination of what had become the primary focus within NATO 
and the "VEU-the out-of-area issue.38 Although NATO Secretary 
General Manfred Woerner publicly cautioned that the EC should not 
attempt to "usurp or overtake the alliance military role" by adopting 
an independent military approach, the VVEU Secretary General 
seemed to indicate, by suggesting that "for want of a foreign and secu-
rity policy, there is a genuine risk of the community becoming a spec-
tator on the sidelines of history, "39 that the EC and an increasingly 
incorporated VVEU might attempt to manipulate the Kuwait Crisis to 
forge its own future outside the NATO Charter area. Disorganization, 
a lack of post-Cold War strategic planning in the European Political 
Community (EPC) and, above all, inadequate unity of purpose and 
willingness to employ resources40 proved fatal to such an independent 
venture, however, as the EC ground to a stalemate over disagreements 
among France, Germany, and the UK as to whether to pool assets and 
surrender control over national forces to the U.S. 
Thus, on the basis of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty, 
the "VEU convened a August 21, 1990 Paris meeting of defense and 
foreign ministers where it could extract no more than a soft pledge 
from members to participate jointly under U.S. operational command 
in execution of tertiary non-combat missions geared toward enforce-
ment of UN Security Council Resolution 66l.41 Moreover, the "VEU 
could not produce even a tacit agreement as to joint organizational 
ground or air force contributions to the U.S.-led effort. Only the UK 
provided loyal backing to the U.S., whereas France sent half-hearted 
support, the Germans provided money, and the rest of the member-
ship "provided excuses. "42 Furthermore, even with relatively robust 
British and French contributions through the VVEU, the European 
forces sent to the Gulf War were so limited in combat capacity and so 
inadequate even in the defense of specifically European sources of oil 
38 A]exender Moens, The Formotive lrm:s of the .\'1'10 NATO: UijJlomocy ji"O/n London to 
Rome, ill DISCONCERTED EUROPE: THE SEARCH FOR A NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE, sIIjJl"O 
note 21, at 24, 33. 
39 CHRISTIE, slIjno note 32, at 224. 
40 Bark, slIjJm note 25, at 138. 
·41 CHRISTIE, sllj}/"O note 32, at 224. 
42 PETER DUIGNAN & L.H. GANN, THE USA AND THE NEW EUROPE, ]945-1993, at 248 
(1994). 
22 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 24:13 
that EPC, already damaged by the EC's failure to participate meaning-
fully in securing the twelve key UN Security Council enabling votes,43 
appeared to have been banished from Western European responses to 
out-of-area operations even where strategic interests were implicated. 
The Europeanists in the WEU called an Inter-Governmental 
Conference (IGC) in Rome in December 1990 to determine answers 
to three questions.44 First, do EC Member States have essential com-
mon interests and are they prepared to defend them? Second, are se-
curity and defense integral parts of the EC? Third, do EC members 
have the means to realize their objectives? The Europeanists answered 
all three questions in the affirmative and concluded that they had 
been remiss with the Transatlantic Declaration in neglecting to define 
the precise relationship of the WEU to NATO and, despite significant 
uncertainty, neglecting to identify specific out-of-area European de-
fense interests that might differ from those of the larger Alliance. 
Thus, WEU members proposed the generation of a unified com-
mand45 and a realistic and expedient CFSP within the EC to guide a 
more united European political and military response to future crises 
based upon the commitment in the Single European Act of 1987 
(SEA)46 which not only laid the groundwork for a full economic un-
ion but also provided the legal basis for the development of a political 
union with common cooperation in foreign and security policy.47 Eu-
ropeanists, led naturally by France with the Benelux countries and 
Spain in tow and Germany intellectually supportive, argued that, de-
spite its woefully inept response to the Gulf crisis, the WEU should 
become the nucleus of ESDI and subordinate itself only to the Euro-
pean Council prior to its incorporation as the defense arm of an even-
tual European Union. Further, Europeanists demanded transforma-
tion of the WEU functions gradually to a European Union while 
acquiring the organic operational capability to exercise its right to 
operate outside the NATO area, an important defining quality of a 
federal and sovereign EU. Moreover, Europeanists contended that 
NATO should redefine and confine its function to managing the re-
sidual Russian threat rather than attempting to derive a mandate for 
43 Goldstein, supra note 12, at 121-22. 
44 VAN EEKELEN, sll/Jra note 4, at GO. 
45 Robert D. Iformats, A Net" Ell rope: A REnewed Atlantir Link, in EUROPE AND AMERICA 
BEYOND 2000, sllpra note 20, at 63, 64. 
46 SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT (1987). 
47 CHRISTIE, sllpra note 32, at 208. 
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Eastern and Central Europe, a region more properly the domaine re-
serve of the WEU, CSCE, and French diplomacy.48 
On the other hand, the Atlanticists, led by the UK and supported 
by the Netherlands, Italy, Portugal, and Denmark, concerned with 
national control of armed forces in the defense of their territory but 
embarrassed by their military weakness, argued that the "\IVEU should 
remain the European pillar of the U.S.-led NATO umbrella and that 
EC plans for a CFSP should be confined to "soft" issues such as ex-
ports, terrorism, and arms control.49 The delegations were polarized 
further by the Atlanticist proposal for a WEU Rapid Reaction Force 
open to all European members of the Alliance and the Europeanist 
proposal that only those states that were members of both the "\IVEU 
and the EC join a planned Franco-German Brigade to create a sepa-
rate "EUROCORPS" at the disposal of the EC.5o 
This heated and recurrent Great Debate, raising as it did the ex-
istential question as to whether a united Europe would remain merely 
a customs union with some judicial functions or emerge as a true fed-
eral state with independent military capability, assumed religious 
significance as it lapped over into 1991.51 Ultimately, however, the At-
lanticists acceded to Europeanist demands that the WEU become the 
core element of ESDI only after reasoning that NATO would remain 
only indirectly associated with the ECS2 and would continue to pro-
vide a separate forum for the nurturing of Atlanticism and a proven 
basis for the future of Western European collective security. 
In January 1991, EC Member States arrived at a compromise 
formula that provided that, in the future, the WEU, by taking on pri-
mary responsibility for a wide range of out-of-area tasks that affected 
European security and holding joint meetings with EPC, NATO, and 
the recently institutionalized CSCE,53 would demonstrate its emer-
gence as the sole legitimate defense realm of European integration 
and incubator for ESDI capable of drawing reform-minded Eastern 
European nations into the "common European home" without 
threatening Russia.54 In essence, through a reduction of institutional 
48 Moens, sl/jnn note 38, at ~~7. 
49 fd. 
50 fd. at 6~~. 
51 See id. at 61. 
52 fd. at 60. 
53 ALEXIS HERA.CLIDES, HELSINKI-II AND ITS AFTERMATH: THE MAKING OF THE CSCE 
INTO AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 185-86 (199~~). 
54 Hormats, supra note 45, at 6,t 
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differences and informational costs, the WEU would be better posi-
tioned than NATO to accept and execute military missions on behalf 
of the European Commission (Commission) without reigniting the 
Cold War. All concerned could rest assured that the WEU was unre-
servedly committed for the first time to the philosophy of leadership 
within the European sphere of the Alliance, to the process of Euro-
pean integration, and to the development of the independent force 
structure, strategic planning, CFSP, and ESDI necessary to resolve fu-
ture out-of-area crises that threatened the well-being of Europe. How-
ever, no sooner did the framing of this compact conclude the Rome 
ICC than the unholy specter of Yugoslavia emerged from the mists 
enshrouding the uncertain post-Cold War transition in the Balkans. 
II. THE FALL OF YUGOSLAVIA: ACT ONE-BoSNIA 
A. Conceived with Haste, Dissolved with Blood 
On December 1, 1918, Serbian Prince Regent Alexander created 
Yugoslavia from the ashes of World War I. However, the union of dis-
parate national and ethnic groups soon proved to have been a "shot-
gun wedding with a honeymoon as short as the hangover was long,"55 
for Alexander and Serbian politicians saw the purpose of the unified 
Yugoslav state as the unification of all Southern Slavs under the Ser-
bian crown, whereas Croatian and Slovene statesmen envisioned the 
primary raison d'etat to be the recovery and defense of territories 
populated by Croatians and Slovenes from the domination of neigh-
boring states such as Italy, Austria, and Hungary.56 Nevertheless, the 
disciplined communist regime of Marshal Tito reconciled ethno-
national groups who had been set upon each other by the Axis powers 
and granted Macedonians and Bosnians the ethnic recognition that 
the monarchy had refused them and, thus, gave a more solid founda-
tion to Yugoslavia. However, Tito never fully resolved the ethno-
national question, and Yugoslavia, with its eight federal units, twenty-
four ethnic affiliations, and three major religions, survived as a very 
diverse but very fragile federal state.57 
While pro-Western republics Croatia and Slovenia, observing the 
democratic revolutions sweeping Eastern Europe and the Soviet Un-
55 BENNETT, sllpra note 3, at '~3. 
56 ALEKSANDAR PAVKO\'ICH, THE FRAGMENTATION OF YUGOSL~\'IA: NATIONALISM IN A 
MULTINATIONAL STATE 3-4 (1997). 
57 CHRISTIE, sllpra note ,~2, at 239. 
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ion and sensing the lifting of the threat of Soviet invasion, made a 
concerted push toward post-communism, staunchly communist and 
dominant Serbia and its quasi-satellite Montenegro lagged behind in 
the transition. With the republics marching to the beat of very differ-
ent socio-political drummers, the complex internal balance of power 
between federal and republican institutions became increasingly un-
suitable to containing the rival agendas of political leaders emerging 
at the republican level. The weakening of bureaucratic and Commu-
nist Party institutions dissolved the glue that joined Yugoslavia's di-
verse ethnic groups and peoples, and ethnic grievances returned with 
malignant fury. The inaction of international financial institutions, 
tremendous fear and uncertainty, and a heritage of authoritarianism 
unmitigated by civil society58 permitted Serbian intellectuals to re-
vamp their ideology by creating new institutions and bestowing fresh 
legitimacy on Slobodan Milosevic, who vaulted to power by disguising 
Communism as nationalism and calling for the establishment of a 
"Greater Serbia" as the sole means to safeguard Serbian ethno-
national minorities living outside the republican borders of Serbia.59 
Yugoslavia, however, simply could not survive the demise of the 
Communist Party, the loss of national cohesion imposed by the spec-
ter of the Soviet threat,60 and the resurgence of Serbian nationalism. 
The rise of Milosevic, tlie cancellation by fiat of Kosovo's autonomy, 
and the Serbian refusal to recognize Croatia's right to assume the ro-
tating Presidency of federal Yugoslavia offered fertile ground for un-
scrupulous and fanatical republican leaders to launch a bid for sover-
eignty and self-determination at the ethno-national level. Thus, long-
standing Slovenian and Croatian separatism resurfaced when the Par-
liament of Slovenia declared the right to secede in September 1989, 
and nationalist parties won republican elections in Croatia and Slove-
nia in the spring of 1990 that brought intolerant ex-communists to 
power.61 In April 1991, all six republican presidents agreed to hold a 
referendum on whetlIer Yugoslavia should dissolve or reform into a 
more democratic federation. Forcible attempts to prevent secession, 
including transborder invasions by the overwhelmingly superior 
Yugoslav National Army UNA), failed to overcome etlmo-nationalist 
58 Julie Mertlls, Lessons Fmlll Hist01:V: The [/lle/cHhr Minorities Schellles and thR "YUgoSlall 
Nations, • 23 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 793, 799 (1998). 
59 BENNETT, supra note 3, at 10-11. 
60 RICHARD N. HAASS, INTER\,ENTION: THE USE OF AMERICAN MILITARY FORCE IN THE 
POST-COLD WAR WORLD 37 (1994). 
61 Woodward, supra note 31. at 217. 
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state-formation when, on June 25, 1991, Slovenia and Croatia de-
clared independence. 
The depth and extent of the ferocious barbarity that stained the 
Yugoslav Wars of Dissolution (\WD) were difficult to foresee, for not-
withstanding popular misperceptions, interethnic enmity is a myth in 
a region in which the constituent peoples of the former Yugoslavia 
had little historical contact.62 Although the Balkans historically have 
been steeped in violence and bloodshed over territory, to the extent 
any fault lines divided communities, religion was the primary associa-
tional structure prior to national state-formation in the early twenti-
eth century.63 Further, although Yugoslavia was an artificial creation, it 
ultimately was destroyed not by ethnic or religious hatred but by mul-
tiple economic, constitutional, and political crises that sullied the fed-
eralist system and militarized competing national ideologies that each 
laid claim to the same territory for their respective ethno-national 
groupS.64 While \WD in some senses can be reductively described as 
nothing more than a violent but failed attempt to create Greater Ser-
bia65 via an organized program of domestic conflict waged along 
ethno-cultural lines,66 and while interethnic hatreds now have been 
rationalized and will permeate relations for generations,67 there sim-
ply was no basis for the assertion of Balkanist stereotypes to counsel 
against intervention to prevent genocide when military intervention 
could have and would have stopped it.68 \WD, despite the conven-
ience of the Balkanist metaphors, was far from an extended family 
feud between morally equivalent Southeastern European perpetra-
tors-it was the first challenge to the New World Order and the values 
which it was in the fitful process of being founded upon. 
B. EC to the Rescue: ''EuTOpe's Finest Hour" 
Emboldened by the positive results of the Rome IGC and eager 
to flex its recently acquired political muscle in advance of the upcom-
ing June NATO summit, the European Parliament, on March 13, 
62 See BENNETT, supra note 3, at 6. 
63 See ROUMEN I. KONDEV, THE UNITED STATES-RuSSIAN MILITARY COOPERATION IN 
IMPLEMENTATION FORCE OPERATIONS IN BOSNIA 6 (1997). 
64 PAVKOVICH, supra note 56, at ix. 
65 BENNETT, sU/Jra note 3, at 238. 
66 KONDEV, supra note 63, at ix. 
67 Victoria I. Einagel, Lasting Peace in Bosnia? Polictics of Territm:v & Identity, in GEOPOLI-
TICS IN POST-'VALL EUROPE, supra note 1, at 235, 247. 
68 VAN EEKELEN, supra note 4, at 172. 
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1991, declared the "right of the constituent republics and autono-
mous provinces of Yugoslavia ... freely to determine their own future 
in a peaceful and democratic manner and on the basis of recognized 
international and internal borders."69 In response, the U.S., issued its 
Baker 5 Point Plan of April 16, 1991 that insisted that an integrated 
and strengthened Atlantic Alliance remain the primary avenue for 
consultation and the forum for agreement on all policies bearing on 
the security and defense commitments of its members, regardless of 
whether such policies originated in the vVEU. Further, the Baker 5 
Points Plan called upon the WEU to minimize the potential for intra-
NATO divisiveness by increasing inter-institutional transparency 
through opening the WEU deliberations to all European members of 
NATO. Differences between the WEU ambitions and the boundaries 
the U.S. placed upon their realization were resolved with the Copen-
hagen Communique in May 1991 when the vVEU70 accepted the 
Baker 5 Points Plan as the basis for further discussions at the NATO 
summit and, in turn, the U.S. granted tacit approval of an expanded 
WEU role in managing the threats in Central and Eastern Europe 
where it was more appropriate for Europe to be involved than 
NATO.71 While to speak of a European role outside Europe by May 
1991 was merely to speak of the contribution Europe could make to 
the execution of U.S. strategy,72 when the June 1991 decision to hold 
a referendum on whether Yugoslavia should dissolve or reform into a 
more democratic federation triggered serious intercommunal vio-
lence,73 the central question within the Alliance became whether this 
was the sort of specifically "European" problem the solution of which 
the U.S. would defer to Europe and grant the NATO imprimatur for 
WEU intervention. 
Accordingly, at the June 1991 NATO Summit, the U.S. indicated 
that, although the ideal state of affairs in Yugoslavia was a unitary 
state, it was incumbent upon the Yugoslavs to resolve what was essen-
tially an intractable internal conflict. If potentially costly external in-
tervention was indicated, the U.S., with UN concurrence, stressed 
that, given Yugoslav rejection of recent U.S. initiatives, the increased 
69 \"oodward, supra note :~O, at 208. 
70 CONRY, sujHa note 5, at 5. 
71 ''AN EEKELEN, su/na Hote 4, at 9:t 
72 Christopher Coker, East of Suez Rellisitil'd: Thl' Stmll'gir Rl'rolljJ/illg of Hestern Europe and 
the Thhd World, ill THE UNITED STATES, WESTERN EUROPE, AND MILITARY INTERVENTION 
OVERSEAS 1,22 (Christopher Coker ed., 1988). 
73 "AN EEKELEN, slIjJl'O Hote 4, at 140-141. 
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likelihood of success attendant to multilateralism, and the greater 
economic and political influence of the EC relative to the several 
Yugoslav parties, the EC simultaneously should negotiate a peaceful 
end to the conflict, advance a CFSP and ESDI,74 and assume some of 
the financial burden for Western security by implementing a regional 
approach to peripheral conflicts.75 Thus, when U.S. Secretary of State 
James Baker warned of the "dangers of disintegration" and stressed 
that the U.S. would not recognize secessionist republics during his 
visit to Belgrade on June 21, an optimistic Europeanist majority in the 
EC saw in his words a U.S.-authorized mandate for a substantially in-
corporated WEU to press ahead as the principle international collec-
tive security organization in post-Cold War Eastern and Central 
Europe.76 In short order, EC diplomats marched off to Slovenia in 
June 1991 proclaiming in Churchillian fashion the dawning of 
"Europe's finest hour. "77 
1. Brioni Accords: Failure of EC Economic Policy Instruments 
Although the June 27, 1991 Luxembourg European Council 
Summit (Luxembourg) confirmed the "complementary" approach to 
Western European security established in the ,Baker 5 Point Plan78 and 
appeared to prepare the path toward a CFSP as to the resolution of 
the Yugoslav crisis, the dogged, continued pursuit by European pow-
ers of narrow national goals in the battle for Atlanticist or Europeanist 
primacy drove EC members79 into contending camps that ultimately 
yielded a policy vacuum. Although all Western Europeans were of the 
mind that foreign policy differences on the Balkans ought not inter-
fere with the upcoming Maastricht Summit, so underdeveloped was 
Western European thinking relative to CFSP and ESDI that, after the 
CSCE predictably failed to secure the cessation of hostilities and with-
drawal of Yugoslav federal forces from Slovenia,8o the EC was caught 
74 Susan '''oodward, 1711' us Pcrspatille: Transition Period, in THE ISSlIES RAISED BY Bo~-
NL\ AND TilE TRANSATL<\.NTlC DEBATE 44, 45 (Sophia Clement ed., 1998). 
75 ""ooclward, supra note 30, at 227. 
76 DINAN, supra note 33, at 49G. 
77 John]. Kavanagh, Note, Attemptillg to RUII Bljore Leaming to lIfdll.' Probll'lllS of the £(':5 
Common Foreign and Secltlity Poli(y 20 B.C. iN'r'L & COMPo L. RE\,. :~53, :G:~ (1997), 
78 See\'AN EEKELEN, supra note 4, at 97. 
79 Anthony Forster, The Europeall COllllllullity and l\'t>stem EurojJean [fnion, ill DISCON-
CERTED EUROPE: THE SEARCH FOR A NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE, supra note 21, at 48, 
GO. 
80 OLl\,ER RAMSBOTHAM & TOM "'OODHOUSE, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN CON-
TEMPORARY CONFLICT 171 (199G). 
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unprepared. Not only did the EC package of economic sticks fail to 
secure significant concessions, hut with the EC-hrokered Brioni Ac-
cords of July 3 (Brioni) Slovenia and Croatia were required to halt 
their drh'es for independence for ninety days81 and permit unarmed 
EC ohseners into their national territories to ohserve the operations 
of the JNA as it went on to launch a full-scale invasion of Croatia.82 
Although at first hlush Brioni permitted the Europeanists to 
trumpet EC credentials in security and defense, particularly in the 
diplomatic and peacekeeping venues, a more sober analysis reveals 
that the EC had foisted Brioni upon the victims of Serb aggression 
merely to dampen internal dissension and keep the train of European 
integration from derailing by giving the Serbs carte blanche.83 Although 
puhlic opinion in France, the UK, Germany, and Italy-the dominant 
four members of the EC and the WEU-strongly supported interven-
tion to oppose "Serbian aggression, "84 and although the pooled mili-
tary capacity of France and the UK alone was more than adequate to 
accomplish this mission, an obdurate stubbornness and unwillingness 
to resolve disagreements over recognition, the application of military 
force, and the future of European integration and the role of CFSP 
and ESDI within it doomed a collective Western European response. 
Western Europeans migrated into opposing blocs with the UK and 
France leaning toward support for a united Yugoslavia but themselves 
uncertain as to intervention and a reunified Germany diametrically 
opposed in its support for Croatian aild Slovenian independence.85 
Coupled with the EC institutional requirement of unanimity for deci-
sions trenching upon foreign affairs and defense,86 this initial policy 
divergence magnified longstanding internecine feuds and renational-
ized foreign and security policies, thereby proving fatal to European 
collective security measures.87 
81 \\'oodward, slI/lm note 30, at 210. 
82 BENNETT, sul}m note 3, at 160. 
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CONCERTED EUROPE: THE SEARCH FOR A NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE, sUj}m note 21, at 
76,88. 
86 Baer, slIpm note 84, at 312. 
87 Sophia Clement, Introdurtion, ill THE ISSUES R'\ISED BY BOSNIA AND THE TRANSAT-
L-\NTIC DEBATE, slIj}J(I note 74, at 1, 3. 
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2. CFSP: Victim to the Great Debate 
The neutralist vision of the UK led Britain to channel its activity 
through multilateral institutions such as CSCE and the UN while con-
taining unsustainable or rash policy actions by other EC members. 
Convinced that in the developing civil war no party had a monopoly 
on virtue or villainy and that European intervention would be ineffec-
tive without U.S. involvement88 while offering Russia an opportunity 
of revanchement,89 the UK demanded that EC and WEU Member 
States be given free rein to vigorously defend vital national interests90 
rather than be drawn into collective Western European recognition of 
impending republican declarations of independence.91 Similarly, al-
though France opposed the Serb policy of ethnic cleansing, justice 
was subordinate, and "the use of ... WEU was what was important, 
not the purpose for which it might be used. "92 
By contrast, Germany drew upon the common Catholic heritage 
of Bavaria with the two Yugoslav republics, the influence of the sub-
stantial number of Croatian emigres in Germany,93 German he-
gemonistic interests in Mitteleuropa, and outrage at Serb atrocities94 
in attempting to shape the direction of the CFSP of the EC even to 
the point of further fanning the flames of the war. In an open chal-
lenge to French and British leadership in early August, Germany 
broke ranks and deployed its economic might to convert undecided 
Italy and the Benelux to its position that Serb aggression across inter-
national borders was responsible for the war and that recognition of 
the breakaway republics was sine qua non to its termination.95 These 
actions augured ill for those who believed that achievement of a CFSP 
would flow naturally from economic integration. Notwithstanding the 
potency of German moral leadership, with only the UK and France 
among the entire WEU and EC contingent possessed of the capacity 
to project military force well beyond their borders into the Balkans, 
and neither the UK nor France willing to do so in support of the in-
88 JAMES Go\\', TRIUMPH OF THE LACK OF \VILL: INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY AND THE 
YUGOSLWWAR 175-78 (1997). 
89 MICHAEL MANDELBAUM, THE DAWN OF PEACE IN EUROPE 31 (1996). 
90 Forster, supra note 79. at 62. 
91 M.-\NDELBAUM, supra note 89, at 30. 
92 Go\\', sllj}m note 88, at 158. 
93 MANDELBAUM, su/}ra note 89, at 30. 
94 Go\\', sUj}m note 88, at Hi8. 
95 NEWHOUSE, supra note 7, at 82. 
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dependence of Croatia and Slovenia, Europe, by August 1991, was 
slipping into the torpor of policy paralysis. 
C. Mulling over the ''Euro-Options'' 
l. Military Intervention 
The European Council convened the European Community 
Peace Conference on September 7, 1991 (Peace Conference) in the 
Hague to develop a unified and holistic approach to the Yugoslav cri-
sis, to request that the WEU examine military options in the expecta-
tion that the members of the EC and the "VEU ultimately would re-
solve their teleological differences as to precisely what to do with 
Yugoslavia, and in anticipation that the UN Security Council would 
provide the legal basis for armed intervention. In the first serious 
plenary discussion on September 12, WEU members rejected peace 
enforcement in Croatia on the dogmatic grounds that, despite the 
post-World War II evolution of the doctrine of humanitarian interven-
tion, even the stationing of peacekeepers on Croatian soil would re-
quire the consent of the Serbian and federal governments that for 
obvious reasons could not be secured.96 However, the delegates 
agreed in theory to consider permissive entry for peacekeeping pur-
poses provided the UN and the CSCE issued a clear mandate and de-
vised robust rules of engagement for force-protection purposes. 
The following four proposals dominated the increasingly heated 
discussions over the next two weeks: (1) a WEU battalion of fewer 
than 1,000 troops would provide logistical support to unarmed EC 
monitors observing a cease-fire; (2) a WEU regiment of 3,000-5,000 
troops would escort and protect EC monitors; (3) a WEU brigade of 
10,000 troops would support EC monitors in a variety of functions; 
and (4) a WEU division of 20,000 troops would implement an ex-
panded peacekeeping option. 
These debates sullied the prospects for a WEU role in Yugoslavia, 
as arguments over whether anything productive could be accom-
plished and whether the commitment would prove open-ended laid a 
transparent veneer over the eternal Atlanticist-Europeanist divide. 
VVhereas France was keen to send a large combat-ready force and thus 
opted for something between options (3) and (4), it refused to act 
96 Marc Weller, ell/Tent Dl'lleloplllent: Thl' International Response to the Dissolution of Yugo-
sillvia, 86AM.J. INT'LL. 569, 575 (1992). 
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until a firm cease-fire was holding on the ground.97 The UK, prefer-
ring to operate through NATO as it believed a force of at least corps 
strength would be needed to conduct heavy combat operations in 
mountainous terrain, argued for option (1) in an attempt to undercut 
the WEU altogether.98 While the Benelux countries and Greece 
lacked sufficient forces and Spain and the Netherlands sufficient ex-
perience to participate meaningfully and thus elected option (2) as a 
reasonable half-measure, participation by Italy, which was willing to 
support option (3) but preferred option (2), was ruled out com-
pletely as objectionable to Serbia. Although Germany argued cogently 
for the viability of full-scale intervention as the sole method capable 
of ending the war,99 its constitution forbade its participation outside 
the NATO treaty-area. IOO 
Although all WEU members could agree that their organization 
should dispatch a monitoring force to isolate the sources of conflict 
and ensure an orderly transitional process without influencing the 
outcome,IOI ultimately the fear of casualties, Soviet denunciation of 
any planned Western intervention, and a continuing and fundamen-
tal inability to synchronize a CFSP led to the failure to task the WEU 
even to the support of EC-planned humanitarian relief operations. 
Unable by late September 1991 to fulfill even a minimalist role in ad-
vancing the cause of European security and defense, the WEU could 
not hope to accomplish more than the provision of largely symbolic 
assistance to the implementation of future UN resolutions. I02 In its 
first serious post-Cold War foreign policy endeavor, United Europe, 
despite collective possession of the overwhelming military capacity to 
forcibly and decisively intervene to prevent genocide,I03 "thanks to the 
curious alchemy of German leadership, Italian support for it, British 
97 Moens & Anstis, Failures of the First Round and a Proposal for a New Strategy, in DISCON-
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100 James Cow & Lawrence Freedman, Intervention in a Fragmenting State: The Case of 
Yugoslavia, in To LOOSE THE BANDS OF \VICKEDNESS: INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION IN THE 
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limitation of it, [and] French ambition ... [created an] alloy of 
common foreign policy ... inescapably less than gold. "104 
'With Europe agreeing as to Yugoslayia only that it would "not 
haye its people killed there,"105 in exasperation the UK and France 
aborted all efforts in the WEU and removed the issue from the glar-
ingly otiose EC to the UN, seeking to motivate Western Europeans to 
some form of visible collective action by way of a mandate for interpo-
sition based on the July Final Communique of the G-7 London Sum-
mit that promised a more efficient and effective UN peacekeeping 
role in future crises.106 However, within the UN forum the bitterly di-
vided EC members could agree on nothing more than a general and 
complete embargo on deliveries of weapons and military equipment 
to Yugoslavia on September 25, 1991 with UN Security Council Reso-
lution 713,107 and the aspirational quest toward "assertive multilateral-
ism" began its "lingering death" as repeated rounds of UN Security 
Council resolutions failed to halt the war. lOS In its Five Points of Sep-
tember 26, 1991, the WEU handed the mess back to an embarrassed 
EC and concluded the following: (1) the Yugoslav conflict should be 
resolved in the Peace Conference, but the WEU would have no role; 
(2) the decision whether and how to deploy military force was for the 
WEU to make but only with the approval of the EC; (3) the WEU 
would cOlltinue to determine its own national burden-sharing and 
financial arrangements; (4) implementation of UN Security Council 
Resolution 713 required further study as to possible contribution by 
the WEU; and (5) the problem of what to do once the republics de-
clared independence was for the EC.109 
In dismayed response to the structural fatigue and imminent col-
lapse of its European pillar, NATO grimly established the Allied Stra-
tegic Concept at its Rome Summit of November 7-8,1991 to preserve 
ESDI by strictly delimiting the boundaries within which it might inde-
pendently operate. As President Bush made painfully clear, the U.S., 
although prepared to tolerate the WEU as the European pillar of the 
Alliance, no longer could afford to entertain the unreliable and inept 
WEU as a viable alternative to NATO. Thus, while the WEU could 
104 Gow & Freedman. SlIjJrfl note 100, at 1 :W. 
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participate in the assessment of new risks and threats and make a 
symbolic European contribution to the Four Core Functions of 
NATO, deterrence, defense against attack on any member, provision 
of a foundation for a stable security environment in Europe based on 
democratic institutions and peaceful resolution of conflicts, and pre-
serving the strategic balance in Europe,110 internal fractures within 
the WEU had relegated the European pillar of the Alliance to the 
sidelines of the epic Balkan struggle that was to transpire. 
2. Diplomatic Resolution 
a. Recognition 
Following the NATO Rome Summit and the political castration 
of the WEU, the EC made a last-ditch effort to effect a compromise 
that would allow it to influence the course of the confl~ct in Yugosla-
via. Of the three reliable weapons in the European repertoire origi-
nally available to address Yugoslavia-economic sanctions, political 
employment of public opinion, and diplomatic recognition-only 
one had survived unscathed by the political disasters of the previous 
months.ll1 By December 1991, a coalescing majority in the EC ac-
cepted the German argument that EC recognition of Croatia and Slo-
venia would uphold the moral principle of self-determination, pres-
sure the Serbs to accept negotiated peace talks, and accord the EC a 
continuing role in the management of the conflict. Although the 
official EC line tracked closely the deeply flawed U.S. position that 
recognition would be premature prior to a comprehensive and nego-
tiated political settlement and only would make the crisis more intrac-
table, on December 17, the EC stated that while no Yugoslav republic 
would be recognized prior to January 15, 1992, the Badinter Commis-
sion, an EC Council-created judicial body, immediately would accept 
applications and make adjudications on the basis of the principles in 
the newly published "European Community Guidelines on the Rec-
ognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union."1l2 
Pressured to intervene by the U.S. in order to forestall the ex-
pected EC recognition of Croatia and Slovenia and obviate the inevi-
table subsequent calls for forcible NATO intervention across territo-
110 Sl!e Moens, supra note :~8, at 26. 
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rial borders, the CSCE obediently attempted to intercept EC recogni-
tion without interfering with the respective positions of its equally di-
vided members.1I3 However, with the boundary between human rights 
and security in Europe effaced in an era where ethnic nationalism, 
mistreatment of minorities, and resurgent racism were the principle 
security threats,1I4 and mesmerized as it was by the inability to square 
its fear of territorial disintegration with the principle of self-
determination of peoples, CSCE could accomplish nothing more than 
the issuance of "toothless platitudes" and "cloying bromides such as 
security is indivisible."1l5 Although "CSCE cannot be blamed for not 
'solving' what is arguably the most difficult problem in international 
politics (national rights v. state sovereignty), "116 in failing to square 
the contending principles of international law, CSCE and subse-
q'uently the EC unwittingly ushered in the next, more vicious phase of 
the conflict: on January 15, 1992, the Badinter Commission provided 
the legal and political framework for the post-Cold War transition 
from a single federal Yugoslavia to several independent states in hold-
ing that Slovenia and Croatia were independent subjects of interna-
tionallaw1l7 against which there could be and had been an illegal use 
of cross-border force. 1I8 
b. Partition Plan #1,' Carrington-Cu ti liero 
Although EC recognition of Croatia and Slovenia provided the 
legal instrument that at last terminated the political existence of the 
long-moribund federal Yugoslavia and aided UN mediator Cyrus 
Vance in negotiating the cease-fire in Croatia in UN Security Council 
Resolution 727, the utter inability of the EC to capitalize upon recog-
nition and cease-fire and otherwise influence the tragic course of 
post:June 1991 events was a serious blow to the confidence of Western 
Europeans.1I9 In February 1992, Chief Negotiator Jose Cutiliero and 
Chairman Lord Carrington introduced a comprehensive peace plan 
that struck a balance between the Bosnian Muslim and U.S. insistence 
113 See Anstis, slIjJm note 85, at 108-09. 
114 Id. at 88. 
115 Id. at 105. 
116 Moens & Anstis, slIpm note 97, at 231. 
117 Go\\', supm note 88, at 69-70. 
118 See id. at 74-75. 
1J9 NEWHOUSE, supra note 7. at 20-21. 
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on justice and a unitary state120 and Croatian and Serb insistence on 
the equitable division of the unraveling fonner Yugoslav republic into 
three ethnic states. The plan called for the ethnic division of Bosnia 
into seven to ten largely autonomous cantons based on near-absolute 
ethnic majorities under a loose central government, urged the UN 
Security Council to reduce economic resources available to Serbia via 
a total trade embargo, induced NATO enforcement of the peace with 
air and naval power and raised the taboo issue of the autonomous ar-
eas of Yugoslavia including Kosovo.121 Although EC efforts to foist the 
Carrington-Cutiliero Plan succeeded in securing Serbian and Croa-
tian agreement to UN Security Council Resolution 743, Serb refusal 
to negotiate further in good faith despite gentle Russian prodding 
and a joint UN-EC ultimatum doomed EC negotiations.122 Even as 
nearly fifteen thousand of their troops marched off to serve in a 
United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) ,123 and Bosnia 
erupted following the March Bosnian declaration of independence, 
Europeans paid little attention to the implications of the drawn-out 
defeat of the Carrington-Cutiliero plan in which their political leaders 
were so invested. 
c. Ostrich Politics: Turning Inward 
With Yugoslavia having so cruelly defied its peacemaking endeav-
ors, the EC temporarily disengaged from the Balkans to reevaluate 
the meaning of collective European security and reassess foreseeable 
future threats. Beset by economic stagnation and the difficult conver-
sion from collective industrial to private individualized service 
economies,124 an increasingly diverse and reideologized EC125 jetti-
soned the predominant fixation on collective trans-Atlantic security in 
favor of the more urgent economic rivalry emanating from NAFTA 
and the Pacific Rim. Without exception, members of the WEU and 
the EC reduced base force structures, trimmed military budgets by 
more than fifty percent,126 and for the moment, consigned thoughts 
120 Nimet Beriker Atips, Mediating Regional Conflicts and Negotiating Flexibility: Peace Ef 
forts in Bosnia-HerzegolJinia, 542 ANNALS M-r. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 185, 190 (1995). 
121 ld. at 190. 
122 Mats BerdaI, United Nations PeacekeejJing ill the Former Yugoslavia, in BEYOND TRADI-
TIONAL PEACEKEEPING, supra note 13, at 228,229-30. 
123 DINAN, sllpm note 33, at 494. 
124 See id. at 275-76. 
125 See id. 
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of a European Army along with intervention of any sort in Yugoslavia 
to the ashcan of Western European intellectual history. 
The Treaty of Rome did not encompass the thorny issues of de-
fense, security, or foreign policy, as the Community was not to be con-
stituted solely by formal treaties but rather to be located within a 
wider political emi.ronment in which popular aspiration to political 
integration and eyen union with common foreign and defense poli-
cies would occur as part of an eyolutionary process.127 While a general 
consensus considered it prudent to enhance the roles and responsi-
bilities of the "VEU ,128 the cyclical call for independent eurocapabil-
ities in security issued yet again by the French-led Europeanists struck 
many observers as devoid of substantiye merit at a time when no evi-
dent common interests could be found to underpin a separate de-
fense identity that only would undermine the trans-Atlantic link while 
creating conflicts with European antifederalists. 129 As France, Spain 
and, to a lesser extent, Germany intended in bringing security discus-
sions within the Maastricht process, staunch Atlanticist opposition 
from the UK and Italy, coupled with constructive minimalist absten-
tion by Ireland and Denmark and indifference by Belgium, threat-
ened to deny the Commission the opportunity to place its bureau-
cratic hands around European security.130 Similarly, Euroskeptics, who 
saw in the rapid broadening and deepening of the EC an effort by 
Eurosocialists to strip away yestigialnational sovereignties and curren-
cies131 and re-socialize Europe via the backdoor of the Commission,132 
lobbied against inclusion of security issues in the negotiations. Only 
the Maastricht Compromise, a declaration appended in December 
1991, as Title V, "Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Pol-
icy," to the agreement concluded by the EC as a precursor to the 1992 
negotiations on the TEU, preserved a place for collective Western 
European security in TEU. 
With Title V, Article j, TEU enumerated the broad objectives of 
the EC to 
safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and 
independence of the Union; to strengthen the security of 
12i See Salmon, supra note III. at 223. 
12R SeeWEU SECRETARIAT-GENERAL. WEU TODAY 13-\4 (1997). 
129 See Simon Lunn. The Futllre of i\~4TO. ill THE COLD WAR LEGACY IN EUROPE. sujnn 
note 12. at 7, 20. 
130 SIMON DUKE, THE NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY DISORDER BI (1994). 
131 See DUIGNAN & GANN. sll/Jm note 42. at 5:~-:)4. 
132 Bark, slI/Jm note 25, at 28. 
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the Union and its Member States in all ways; to preserve 
peace and strengthen international security, in accordance 
with the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as 
the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of 
the Paris Charter; to promote international cooperation; 
and to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of 
law, and respect for human rights and fundamental free-
doms. I33 
Although to these ends TEU purported to expand the coordina-
tion of foreign policy by permitting the European Council to set 
guidelines enabling the Council of Ministers to take foreign policy 
decisions on matters that should be subject to joint action on a 
qualified m~ority rather than a unanimity basis,I34 under Article ].3.6 
Member States retained the right to take independent foreign policy 
measures in cases of urgent and imperative need arising from 
changed circumstances when the Council had failed to act. Despite 
evidence of the newfound EC commitment to a CFSP in TEU Articles 
].1.1 and ].1.4, by permitting Member States to subjectively define ur-
gency and imperative need as well as changed circumstances, it was 
nearly indisputable that TEU effectively had withdrawn formalized 
foreign policy cooperation, particularly with respect to the more 
complex issues of security policy, from the integrative efforts of the 
EU. 
Furthermore, although TEU ended the taboo of the EC's failure 
to discuss defense and thus raised high expectations for the emer-
gence of an official ESDI, Article J.4 executed little more than a brief 
sketch of this fundamental element of European integration. Al-
though it referred to the "eventual framing of a common defense po~­
icy which might address all questions of foreign and security policy" 
and "in time might lead to a common defense," Article J.4.1, in mak-
ing allowances for the specific character of Member States' security 
and defense policies and restricting cooperation to only those subis-
sues upon which unanimity could be reached, effectively withdrew 
CFSP and ESDI from the project of European integration. I35 Moreo-
ver, although Article]. 7.1 stressed that the EC would foster closer in-
stitutional relations with and even consider incorporation of the 
WEU, in providing merely that Member States accept "in accordance 
133 TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, art.J.5. 
134 Id. art.J.3.1-2. 
135Id. 
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with their respective constitutional requirements" the European 
Council's recommendation that the "VEU help elaborate and imple-
ment EC defense-related foreign policy decisions as the European de-
fense ann,136 not only was the "VEU denied a long-awaited permanent 
mandate, but the perennial Europeanist dream that the VVEU become 
an alternate defense organization died along with any clear and ex-
clusive "VEU military function more significant than the formulation 
of policy under the shadow of the European Council.137 
EC members, as a practical matter, still were unwilling to collec-
tively slip from the U.S. protective embrace,138 and the VVEU with no 
timetable for EU incorporation139 and dependent on the NATO force 
pool,l4O still was nothing more than the most efficient means to 
strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance,l41 demon-
strate the Atlanticist commitment to burden sharing in NATO,l42 and 
determine the appropriate division of labor between the pillars of the 
Alliance. l43 With not even the most dedicated Europeanists willing to 
sever the security link to the U.S., NATO remained the institution of 
choice for the EC, and the progressive development of the VVEU as its 
defense arm in TEU functioned as a pareto-optimal trans-Atlantic 
compromise consequently amenable even to the French delegation.144 
In sum, TEU properly could be described as a victory for Atlanticism 
and European antifederalism, a frank acknowledgement of the pri-
macy of NATO in security and defense, and the death knell for per-
ennial but overblown attempts to launch an ESDI on the hot air gen-
erated by endemic national policy differences. 145 In subsequent 
months, the VVEU shifted its civilian secretariat from London to Brus-
sels in order to be closer to both European institutions and to NATO 
and invited Denmark, Greece, and Ireland to accede or become ob-
servers and non-EC members Norway, Iceland, and Turkey to become 
associate members. 
136 G. Porter Elliot, Neutrality. the Acquis COlIIlIIl/llal//ail¥' aun/hl' EUfOjJl'an Unioll:5 Search 
for a Common FVI¥'ign alln SecUlity PoliC)' ul1dl1' Title t' of /he Mam/rich/ Treaty: The Accession of 
Aus/lia, Finlann and SWl'den, 25 GA.]. INT'L & COMPo L. G01, G15 (l99G). 
137 Phillippe Manin. The Tlm/y ofAlIIs/l'rnall/, 4 COLUM.]. EUR. L. 1, 17 (1998). 
138 See Salmon, sujJra note Ill, at 248. 
139 See REES, sltjJra note 34. at 5:t 
140 BIRCH, sujJra note 18, at 10. 
BI DINAN, supra note 33, at 48G. 
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With the EC preoccupied by Maastricht and tentative after its 
egregious fumbling of the Croatian and Slovenian crises, the political 
situation in the triethnic republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina devolved 
into open ethnic conflict, with the Serb plurality supported by the 
Yugoslav federal government and the JNA. CSCE briefly reassumed 
diplomatic center stage on March 24, 1992 with the Helsinki-II meet-
ings wherein Yugoslavia, consisting of Serbia and Montenegro, argued 
against CSCE's considering the reaffirmation of EC recognition of 
Croatia and Slovenia as well as Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.146 
Whereas Yugoslavia traditionally had been a visible patron of minority 
politics in European and global security institutions, in the CSCE fo-
rum it now claimed recognition would "prejudge the outcome" of the 
upcoming EC-sponsored London Peace Conference.147 Although UN 
Secretary General Perez de Cuellar indicated that the situation in 
Bosnia precluded interposition of a UN peacekeeping force and ad-
monished that recognition of Bosnia would provoke YUgoslavia and 
widen the war, the EC nevertheless recognized Bosnia on April 6. 
Similarly undaunted by the pusillanimous postulations of the UN, on 
May 12 CSCE acted decisively to suspend Yugoslavia148 after its finding 
of "clear, gross, and uncorrected violations of CSCE commitments" by 
the JNA sparked a Yugoslav veto on the basi", of a "consensus minus 
one" formula that allowed a single member to block collective ac-
tion.149 Although discussions in the summer of 1992 moved toward 
assignment of regional crisis management roles and fixed interrela-
tionships of the UN, CSCE, NATO and the WEU, although NATO 
agreed to "support, on a case-by-case basis ... peacekeeping activities 
under the responsibility of the CSCE ... by making available Alliance 
resources and expertise,"150 and while WEU members offered to as-
sign troops to the WEU under NATO command for combat missions 
in ultima ratio,151 the unwieldy and supernumerary CSCE could not 
summon the collective political will from its fifty-two member gov-
ernments to reconcile divergent interests, draw up procedures for 
peacekeeping, and commit to military intervention.I52 Thus, the lack 
146 HERACLIDES, supra note 53, at 43. 
147Id. 
148 VAN EEKELEN, supra note 4, at 142-4:t 
149 HERACLIDES, supra note 53, at 84. 
150 VAN EEKELEN, supra note 4, at 151. 
151 Steven L. Burg, The International COllllllunity & the Yugoslav Crisis, in INTERNATIONAL 
ORGINIZATIONS AND ETHNIC CONFLICT, supra note 30, at 235, 270-71. 
152 CHRISTIE, supra note 32, at 229. 
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of remaining policy instruments with which to condition Yugoslav be-
havior robbed CSCE of the interlocking institutional framework of 
any capacity to affect the deteriorating environment in Bosnia. 
The vVEU is seeking to add a detailed operational capacity to the 
political foundation of TEU Title V and to clarify its ambiguous role 
as defense ann of the EU and European pillar of NATO. It adopted 
the Petersberg Declaration on Yugoslavia of June 19, 1992 (Peters-
berg) that pledged its members to "support, on a case-by-case basis 
and in accordance with our procedures, the effective implementation 
of conflict-prevention and crisis-management measures, including 
peacekeeping activities of the CSCE or the United Nations Security 
Council. "153 By committing its members to Petersberg, the WEU be-
gan the process of creating forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU) and 
in so doing took several giant leaps down the road to an ESDI. Fur-
ther, although NATO primacy under Article V of the modified Brus-
sels Treaty and the obligation to consult with the Alliance to preserve 
complementarity were clearly acknowledged, Petersberg attempted to 
strengthen the operational role of the WEU by permitting the WEU 
Council, in accordance with Article 48 of the UN Charter and in sup-
port of relevant UN Security Council resolutions, to deploy appropri-
ate double-hatted FAWEU "by land, sea or air" at echelons up to corps 
level154 for peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, and rescue operations 
in crises involving European security.155 Now touting itself as the sole 
regional organization linked to both the EC and NATO capable of 
conducting low-intensity conflict operations in the European tllea-
ter156 and despite its lack of a Supreme Commander or peacetime 
headquarters, the WEU established a "Forum of Consultation" with 
Central and Eastern European states now interested in EU member-
ship and began to prioritize areas that, on tile basis of geographic 
proximity and economic and political importance to the EU, should 
be considered in terms of future WEU intervention,157 
153 ""EU SECRETARIAT-GENERAL, supra note 128, at 10-11. 
154 See DINAN, Sll/Jra note 33, at 487. 
155 VAN EEKELEN, supra note 4. at 127. 
156 WEU SECRETARIAT-GENERAL, slI/Jra note 128, at 9. 
15i FOl-stel~ slt/Jra note 79, at 68. 
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D. Abdication oj European Responsibility 
1. The WEU and UNPROFOR in "Support" of UN Humanitarian 
Relief 
With the U.S. unwilling to commit to a major foreign policy ini-
tiative, and with the EC reasonably convinced after Petersberg that it 
finally had the operational capability and the enhanced foreign policy 
necessary,158 the Bosnian morass became the test case for the New 
World European Order. Although rumors of genocide, mass rape, 
and systematic torture appeared in the investigations of both the UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees and human rights groups, politi-
cally-motivated parties on both sides of the Atlantic countered reports 
of bestiality with cavalier suggestions that the peoples of the Balkans 
were fated, either by history or genetics, to engage in barbarous inter-
communal conduct.159 European governments balked at publicly con-
ceptualizing the situation as genocide or lifting the arms embargo 
and shrank from their earlier stand against Serb truculence for the 
more comfortable political shelter of dispassionate neutrality and UN 
overall supervision. Although the EC stressed the importance of es-
tablishing a security zone in and around Sarajevo and declared that 
WEU would be prepared "within the bounds of its possibilities"160 to 
contribute to implementation of all UN Article 48 actions,161 and al-
though the WEU had abundant capabilities to quickly break the en-
circlement of Sarajevo and save an estimated one hundred thousand 
lives,162 the EC and the WEU simply resolved to extend collective ac-
tion no further than the territory of the former Yugoslavia and entan-
glement under the political cover of the UN.163 Accordingly, on July 
10, a special session of the WEU Council of Ministers approved the 
novel but decidedly minimalist and minatory Article 48 missions Op-
eration MARITIME MONITOR and SHARP VIGILANCE. 
Via its capitulation, the EC abdicated its role in Yugoslavia and 
withdrew to attend to internal political triage. In turn, the UN grudg-
ingly assumed responsibility for the mounting crisis.164 By July 1992, 
158 VAN EEKELEN, supra note 4, at 130. 
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160 VAN EEKELEN, supra note 4, at 152. 
161 INST. FOR NAT'L STRATEGIC STUD., A NEW TRANS-ATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP? THE 
U.S., NATO, AND THE EU 3 (1994). 
162 See VAN EEKELEN, supra note 4, at 142. 
163 BENNETT, supra note 3, at 15:~. 
164 See Berda1, supra note 122, at 229. 
2000] The (Dis)illlpgmiioll oflhe Ell 43 
however, the UN passed the next of what amounted to more than sev-
enty Security Council resolutions that went unenforced as regional 
organizations, Member States, and the lightly-equipped and poorly-
armed UNPROFOR peacekeepers stood idly.165 The situation in Bos-
nia became dichotomized while there was a humanitarian problem 
the UN could influence, there also was a desperate military problem 
without a military solution given the lack of political will to impose 
one.166 Although pressure for intervention increased temporarily after 
the August 1992 revelations of indisputable evidence of concentration 
camps in BaI~a Luka and Prijedor struck hard at the conscience of 
the West, no one was stouthearted enough to do anything more about 
it. On August 24, Lord Carrington resigned in disgust in favor of Lord 
Owen, and the EC dropped the Carrington-Cutiliero partition plan 
and yielded all decisional authority to the August 26, 1992 joint EC-
UN London International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia 
(London) led by Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen. 
2. Partition Plan #2: The Shame of Vance-Owen 
Although its delegates talked tough in its opening session by 
affirming the territorial independence of Bosnia and recognizing the 
legal right of self-defense, London devolved rapidly into a glorified 
photo opportunity.167 So diverse were delegates in beliefs and objec-
tives that no positive statesmanship emerged to fashion anything 
more enduring than a vacuous and ephemeral agreement requiring 
Serb leaders to place heavy weapons under UN "supervision" inter-
preted in its original etymological sense (UN monitors were permit-
ted to look at Serb artillery pieces every day while they were fired at 
civilian targets),168 allow free passage of humanitarian relief, prevent 
river traffic up the Danube, adhere to a no-fly zone, and restart the 
stalled Carrington-Cutiliero plan (now renamed Vance-Owen) in the 
Bosnian Serb Parliament. Moreover, although the WEU took the 
London principles seriously and convened an extraordinary ministe-
rial meeting on August 28 to discuss their implementation with a pro-
posed 5,OOO-troop WEU contribution to strengthen UNPROFOR un-
165 See AMOS JORDAN ET AL., AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY: POLICY AND PROCESS 482 
(1993) . 
166 See NOEL MALCOLM, BOSNIA: A SHORT HISTORY 245-4G (1994). 
167 Sp(' Christopher A. Riley, Npither Frl'(, Nor Fair: The 1996 Bosllian Eler/iolls and till' Fail-
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168 MALCOLM, sli/millote I GG, at 24G. 
44 Boston College Illternational & Comparative Law Relliew [Vol. 24:13 
der the upcoming UN Security Council Resolution 776,169 not only 
were the London principles and the Vance-Owen plan ignored as 
soon as public outrage died down,170 but the joint EC-UN negotiating 
team of Vance and Owen began to treat the Serbs not as barbaric ag-
gressors but as one of "three warring factions" to be treated as an 
equal partner with equally valid claims and grievances and, by No-
vember, gradually shelved all threats of military force.l7l Worse, when 
Bosnian Muslim and Croat leaders objected to the subsequent drafts 
of plans that would reward Serb aggression and, by granting full legis-
lative, judicial, and executive powers to the cantons, make it impossi-
ble to believe that Muslims could ever return to Serb-ruled regions,172 
NATO and EC diplomats branded them with calumnious epithets 
such as "deal-breakers" and "sore losers as if genocide were some kind 
of ethnic football game."173 EC refusal, fueled by British and French 
obduracy and an unshakeable Franco-Anglo commitment to Vance-
Owen, prevented NATO implementation of the U.S. proposal to re-
move European peacekeepers from UNPROFOR, lift the UN arms 
embargo, and bomb in support of the Bosnian Muslims. In rewarding 
aggression and sacrificing all pretext to justice and legal legitimacy, 
EC rejectionism in the autumn of 1992 constituted the first major dip-
lomatic turning point, the catalyst for intensified Serb butchery, and 
the swan song of any effective EC participation in the resolution of 
the genocidal wars in Yugoslavia.174 
In due course, on November 3, 1992, the Bosnian Serb Parlia-
ment rejected in large measure the Vance-Owen Plan and withdrew 
from the First Geneva Ministerial Talks,175 believing it could achieve 
total victory on the field of battle without recourse to Vance-Owen.176 
Following the Second Geneva Ministerial Talks of December 1992, 
where the West utterly capitulated to the Bosnian Serb leadership and 
departed with no expectations of future negotiation, the military fo-
cus shifted from NATO and the WEU to UNPROFOR, with the objec-
tive of the establishment of safe areas that proved impotent to protect 
169 VAN EEKELEN, slipra note 4, at 160-61. 
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refugees and consciences equally. Reacting to the carnage that fol-
lowed the willful abandonment of the last diplomatic efforts in 1992, 
CSCE at its Stockholm Meeting could only issue an anguished but hol-
low plea for the end to the war in Bosnia and the maintenance of its 
sovereignty and territorial integrity.177 
3. Heavy Lies the Head: The Frustrating Search for a Successor 
By the end of 1992, those on both sides of the Atlantic who be-
lieved Bosnia and Western credibility could be saved only if the U.S. 
would reassert its role were encouraged when the outgoing Bush Ad-
ministration named Milosevic, Bosnian Serb President Radovan 
Karadzic, and Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladic war criminalsl78 
and warned Serbia that the U.S. would intervene if Serbia violated the 
autonomy of Kosovo by force. However, President-elect Clinton and 
his nominees for post on his foreign policy team soon dashed hopes 
for U.S. intervention in Bosnia. In December 1992, Clinton not only 
contemplated total U.S. withdrawal of military forces from Europel79 
but also determined that any U.S. intervention, the extent of which 
would be limited to humanitarian assistance, would require explicit 
UN Security Council authorization. Clinton also concluded, in the 
absence of an international consensus on what precisely to do with 
Bosnia, a peripheral U.S. interest,180 that it was now more proper for 
the U.S. to cure its domestic ills and abandon its over-assertive role as 
world leader and gendarme.181 
Consequently, the EC and its foreign policy and security institu-
tions, rather than the U.S. and NATO, were ordained by the Clinton 
Administration as the appropriate fora for locating and incubating all 
political and military solutions to the crisis despite the previous rec-
ord of European failure. 182 However, with the "VEU ready to perform 
so-called humanitarian "Petersberg tasks" in Bosnia and thereby fulfill 
its role as the European pillar of the Alliance, the participants in the 
December Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brus-
sels did not feel pressed to even mention Yugoslavia as one of the po-
177 See ARIE BLOED, THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE: 
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tential areas being considered for either NATO or WEU peacekeep-
ing. 
4. UNPROFOR, Neutrality, U.S. Indifference: A Recipe for European 
Security Disorder 
January 1993 dawned with TEU transforming the EC into the 
fifteen-member EU, a higher stage of political and economic integra-
tion. Although the addition of neutrals Austria, Finland, and Sweden 
introduced potential monetary and geostrategic resources with which 
to assist development of an EU CFSP, by downplaying the military di-
mension of foreign policy and emphasizing economic and coopera-
tive approaches to security in its stead,183 the enigmatic Euroneutrals 
placed a stumbling block in the path of the post-Petersberg develop-
ment of ESDI and of the WEU as EU defense arm and further com-
plicated the elusive search for an EU role in Yugoslavia. With four of 
its fifteen members now controlling a bloc of fourteen votes and 
needing only twenty-six votes to defeat security-oriented resolutions 
on qualified majority voting,184 the as-yet inexperienced European 
Council was unable to effect the constructive abstention necessary for 
the Euroneutrals to avoid military commitments violative of their neu-
trality while at the same time permitting development of the WEU as 
the ESDI of the EU .185 By 1993, Western politicians, obsessed with 
popular opinion polls indicating compassion fatigue and frightened 
by the domestic consequences of a military disaster in Bosnia,186 were 
decidedly uneager to articulate innovative or bold military options to 
the Bosnian crisis. Although the U.S. forswore unilateral intervention 
that in its opinion "would kill the peace process and ... undermine 
the partnership we are trying to build with Russia over broad areas," 
the strongly pro-EU and pro-WEU U.S. intimated privately that it 
might be willing, quietly, "to tip the balance" in Europe under certain 
circumstances,187 With this in mind, the UK and France, motivated by 
the revelations of additional Serb atrocities and the desire to reassert 
leadership of the increasingly irrelevant and noncommittal EU, were 
willing to commit ground forces to secure Bosnian Serb acceptance of 
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Vance-Owen provided the U.S. engaged its forces as well. However, 
the Clinton Administration was too hamstrung by economic 
difficulties and a perceived absence of compelling strategic interests 
to attempt to rally public support for intervention beyond the lift-and-
strike proposal the Europeans rejected. ISS 
In a final effort to salvage the historic political and military viabil-
ity of an Atlantic Alliance, the "WEU Council opened a headquarters 
in Brussels in January to facilitate increased NATO cooperation and 
involvement in Yugoslavia. However, only after the February 22 UN 
Security Council Resolution 808 established the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTFY) and dormant peace 
talks resumed in New York in March, did the U.S. reluctantly permit 
NATO to agree in principle in April to begin enforcement of the no-
fly zone in cOI~unction with the UN Secretary General and UNPRO-
FOR. Although the ,,\TEU Council of Ministers approved "WEU en-
forcement of the total economic embargo on Yugoslavia, the Euro-
pean pillar of the Alliance was for the first time more stalwart than its 
North American cousin. Although even the traditionally reluctant 
members of the "WEU had few reservations about plans for Petersberg 
operations clearly ratified by the UN and the "VEU framework,ls9 the 
U.S., by failing to honor its promise to lead enforcement of the no-fly 
zone, refusing to ratchet up the military pressure beyond sporadic 
enforcement of the arms embargo and economic sanctions via intro-
duction of U.S. ground combat forces,190 and taking political refuge 
behind EU skirts and Vance-Owen while inexplicably abjuring over-
whelming U.S. primacy in NATO and the UN,191 allowed the recalci-
trant Bosnian Serb leadership to drag its political feet through the 
spring and yielded the second major diplomatic turning point of the 
war. On May 6, 1993, the Bosnian Serb Assembly triumphantly re-
jected the conditional acceptance given four days previously by Rado-
van Karadzic of the Vance-Owen plan. 
With the EU and its institutions exposed to such an ignominious 
and exhausting political defeat, it was evident that the exhortations 
contained in SEA and TEU on CFSP and ESDI lacked any real rele-
vance in their application to first-order problems such as Yugoslavia. 
The UK, France, and Germany effectively abandoned the EU and the 
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vVEU to join efforts with the U.S. and Russia192 in the belief that the 
road to peace in Bosnia and fulfillment of their ambitions as middle 
powers ran not through institutional multilateralism but through 
Great Power diplomacy linked to NATO. The WEU concluded that if 
it had any remaining role at all it would be the performance of terti-
ary tasks not falling under UNPROFOR and not being performed by 
NATO.193 The WEU Council of Ministers glumly turned to planning 
protection of UN safe areas for Muslim refugees194 and to planning 
for the protection of the EU administration preparing to assist the 
government of the hinterland city of Mostar as part of an anticipated 
U.S.-led Muslim-Croat Federation Agreement then in the process of 
negotiation.195 
Despite the fresh framework the five-power grouping afforded 
for reconsideration of options and objectives, the U.S. maintained its 
minimalist approach in refusing to deploy U.S. ground troops and 
squandering opportunities to exploit the contribution Russian 
influence with the Serbs might have yielded. Although on May 19 the 
Bosnian Muslims and Croats agreed to establish an interim govern-
ment and carry out Vance-Owen,196 U.S. refusal to engage ground 
combat forces depleted all residual energies and creativity the West 
could muster. On May 22, NATO signed the Bosnian death warrant 
when its foreign ministers initialed the Washington Plan that aban-
doned consideration of air strikes and permanently shelved Vance-
Owen in favor of relocation of Muslim refugees to UN safe zones 
(Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, Bihac, and Srebrenica) protected 
not by the WEU but by the 33,OOO-strong UNPROFOR, whose man-
date would be to yield ground in the face of Serb aggression and re-
turn fire against attackers only if UNPROFOR, but not the Muslim 
refugees, came under attack.197 Upon learning of the Washington 
Plan, President Izetbegovic made this piercing statement: 
If the international community is not ready to defend the 
principles which it itself has proclaimed as its foundations, 
let it say so openly, both to the people of Bosnia and to the 
192 HULSMAN, supra note 174, at 124-27. 
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people of the world. Let it proclaim a new code of behavior 
in which force will be the first and the last argument.198 
49 
Although the U.S. threatened to bomb Bosnian Serb forces, to 
protect UNPROFOR humanitarian relief convoys, to destroy Bosnian 
Serb heavy weapons and supply dumps, and to ann the vastly out-
gunned Bosnian Muslims, it never honored any of these proposals.199 
Even after the May 27 North Atlantic Assembly Report warned that 
the theory of multilateral interlocking institutions as the key to pan-
European security is either "sheer nonsense or fundamentally prema-
ture" given institutional rivalries and the underdevelopment of the 
EU and the WEU200 and "may have even contributed directly to policy 
paralysis by inviting dilution of responsibility"201 by allowing politi-
cians to hide in bureaucracies to resist the onslaught of awkward ques-
tions,202 the Clinton Administration reflexively devolved its responsi-
bilities and continued to neglect an examination of the possibilities, 
consequences, and necessities of unilateral action. 203 Arguing in June 
that there was simply no way to "unscramble the ethnic omelette and 
put all ethnic minorities on the 'right' side of the border,"204 the U.S. 
stood aside as British and French queasiness damaged U.S.-EU and 
U.S.-UN relations205 as well as the Anglo-U.S. special relationship.206 
5. Shocked into Service: Exeunt "VEU and the EU; Enter NATO and 
the Contact Group 
NATO, now the only military force capable of ending the war, 
succumbed to the demand of UN Secretary General Boutrous-Ghali 
that NATO airs trikes authorized under UN Security Council Resolu-
tion 836 not only be carried out in coordination with the UN through 
the North Atlantic Council but also that the political authority to ini-
tiate any request for air strikes rested with him (the so-called "double-
trigger" requirement). Not only was NATO anxious to appear to be 
doing much while leaving the onus for its own failure in the hands of 
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the UN,207 but despite the proliferation of UN Security Council Reso-
lutions under U.S. (mis)direction of the Alliance, WED governments 
felt compelled to interpret these resolutions narrowly and defer to the 
UN.208 
By the end of 1993, with a quarter million dead and four million 
refugees, the WEU Assembly concluded that not only had the devel-
opment of CFSP and ESDI been irreparably compromised, but the 
very viability of European aspirations to unity also had been sorely 
tested by the progression of the war in the Balkans.209 
The January 12, 1994 NATO Summit in Brussels convened, and 
the first order of business, rediscovery of a role for NATO in a new 
European security system, required investiture of additional political 
and military capabilities in the Western Europeans.210 While maintain-
ing that it would be foolish for the WEU to duplicate or compete with 
NATO in an era of limited resources, the Alliance agreed that the 
WEU was the clearest demonstration of the will of the ED to 
strengthen the European pillar to balance NATO and simultaneously 
pursue ESDI. Consequently, the Alliance elected to give full support 
to the development of ESDI within the WEU, with the EU the main 
linkage to NATO. Although NATO proper would respond to major 
crises within the Article 5 geographic area of the Washington Treaty, 
the Western Europeans would develop ESDI and foster relations with 
Partnership for Peace states while preparing to respond to lower-
intensity non-Article 5 missions. Under the resulting Combined Joint 
Task Force (CJTF) formula, NATO assets and multinational task-
tailored forces would be made available upon a request stemming ei-
ther from the EU or from the WEU that was approved by all sixteen 
members of the North Atlantic Council. Although Secretary General 
Manfred Worner had made it clear in 1993 that non-Article 5 missions 
were not to be the exclusive preserve of the WEU and that NATO 
might be required to assume "hard" missions with warfighting poten-
tial,211 with CJTF, NATO and the WEU believed they had found an 
appropriate division of labor. 
The EU, briefly recharged by the Brussels Summit Accord, at-
tempted to seize the opportunity to reenter the diplomatic fray by 
pressuring the Bosnian Muslim-led government into accepting a re-
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packaged version of Vance-Owen that even independent observers 
considered tantamount to complete capitulation, the dismemberment 
of the Bosnian state, and the dispossession of two million Muslims.212 
However, though shepherded closer to Bosnian Serb acceptance by 
EU efforts, the Bosnian partition fell to the ground along with Bos-
nian Serb mortar rounds in the Sarajevo Central Market in February 
1994.213 Reluctantly, the U.S. launched unilateral air strikes under the 
NATO-UN fig leaf against Bosnian Serb positions, brokered an 
agreement between Bosnian Croats and Muslims to end their year-
long war, and issued a ten-day NATO "fly and die" ultimatum to the 
Bosnian Serbs that drew no serious Russian protest. When the North 
Atlantic Council of Ministers called a February 7 meeting, tile WEU 
ignored the summons, claiming a lack of resources.214 From this point 
forward, the EU was out of tlle picture, and the Contact Group of the 
U.S., Russia, tile UK, France, and Germany were the only players in 
the international peace process.215 
The WEU attempted to salvage itself in its Permanent Council on 
May 8, 1994, claiming that, as enlargement had brought together all 
the states involved in creation of ESDI,216 the WEU was the only way to 
draw Central and Eastern European republics closer to the EU with-
out Russia's having to fear for its own security.217 However, although 
the WEU now controlled FAWEU and, thus, had some operational 
capacity,218 the Euroneutrals, by insisting on classes of membership in 
which certain states might opt out of peacekeeping or peace en-
forcement operations,219 nipped any WED progress in the bud. 
Moreover, when the North Atlantic Council reiterated in June that 
NATO-WEU collaboration would be developed in strict accordance 
with "transparency and complementarity" on the basis of the CJTF 
concept, increasing NATO predominance led to the renationalizing 
ofFAWEU.220 Over the course of the next six months, the EU and the 
WEU withdrew into a political shell to observe as UN safe zones were 
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overrun for lack of NATO or UNPROFOR defense, and the Contact 
Group produced nothing more just than a generous 51-49 partition, 
the refusal of which by the Bosnian Serbs froze diplomatic progress 
for the remainder of the year. Despite the British and French acknow-
ledgement in September that the U.S. plan of lift-and-strike was nec-
essary, the Clinton Administration, 
having ebbed and flowed in arguments with its Allies on the 
arms embargo question, pulled back from the brink when 
finally forced to confront the real implications of withdrawal, 
lift and strike, and renewed its efforts to engineer an accept-
able settlement. This was ... the ultimate example of uncer-
tainty and incoherence in policy which characterized the 
Administration .... The President provided no steady lead-
ership ... within the government, to the American people, 
or internationally .... [The Clinton] Administration, ... fac-
ing grave difficulties in adjusting to the post-Cold War world 
... damag[ed] ... the U.S .... and ... its relations with 
other countries. . .. [L] ack of preparation, internal confu-
sion, ... uncertain and fluctuating policy and the [at best] 
self-deception involved in making promises which were ei-
ther untenable or which there was no intention of honoring 
[caused] disillusionment and a lack of confidence both at 
home and in the world. 221 
In November, the trans-Atlantic partnership sustained additional 
battering when the U.S. gave the order through NATO to cease im-
plementing the arms embargo on Croatia and Bosnia. Convinced this 
order would cause the conflict to escalate, impose grave risks on civil-
ians and relief workers in field, necessitate the withdrawal of UNPRO-
FOR II, and undermine chances for a negotiated settlement through 
the Contact Group,222 the WEU considered the U.S.-EU relationship 
constructively severed by U.S. actions. 
With the assumption of office by a Republican U.S. Congress in 
January 1995, the eternal burden sharing debate reignited at a most 
inopportune time for the Atlantic Alliance.223 Although Germany had 
agreed to the formation of a joint German-Dutch corps as part of 
FAWEU,224 and Greece had accepted membership, the ,,\lEU had been 
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totally circumscribed by NATO.225 Western Europeans, realizing they 
might have to face tough security decisions alone,226 could only,iew 
the failing "VEU administration of Mostar as a costly disappointment 
and embarrassing symbol of continuing European ineptitude. 227 After 
Bosnian Serbs ignored the UN order to withdraw their artillery from 
the exclusion zone surrounding Sarajevo in May and took additional 
UNPROFOR hostages, European morale plummeted, fingers were 
pointed, and talk of withdrawal circulated within despondent Euro-
pean capitals. Either international cohesion that included the increas-
ingly obstructive Russians or tlle will of the West was required to end 
the war. If it was to be the will of the West, it was clear that NATO (i.e., 
the U.S.) would have to move quickly or engage its forces on the 
ground in combat operations. 
The world watched as the resulting two-week U.S. bombing cam-
paign, unchecked by decidedly anti-reformist Russian efforts in the 
UN Security Council, rapidly and decisively ended the war in Bosnia 
and easily curbed fears of regional war in Europe.228 A October 12 
cease-fire produced peace talks at Wright Patterson Air Force Base in 
Dayton, Ohio that led to an agreement signed in Paris on December 
14. 
E. Reflections in the Aftermath 
1. Dayton: The Dishonorable "Peace" 
The Dayton Agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina (Dayton) illus-
trated that the Western European ability to formulate and implement 
a CFSP still was far too meager in the absence of U.S. leadership and 
even, on occasions, unilateralism.229 However, Dayton produced little 
more than a realpolitik cessation of hostilities that served principally 
to reduce U.S.-EU tensions by placing U.S. troops on the ground.230 
Dayton dodged the choice between peace and justice entirely by offer-
ing up a partition plan the likes of which the French and the British 
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had championed since the beginning of the war.231 While peace de-
layed is preferable to peace denied, the cessation of hostilities was un-
accompanied by justice and came at the price of Russian troops and 
Russian influence creeping back into the Balkans.232 With Dayton, the 
West almost was assured of repeating its mistakes in Kosovo, Albania, 
Macedonia, or the next territory for which Serbian nationalism de-
veloped a post-Communist appetite.233 
The brief U.S. bombing campaign of August revealed that a 
unified Alliance with a legitimate European pillar under the direction 
of competent U.S. leadership could have employed effective military 
force to prevent the war in the first place. The tragedy of Bosnia illus-
trates that a reactive regional organizational approach to conflict 
management led by an internally divided, timid organization is pre-
destined to failure. Furthermore, the absence of a credible 
warfighting capability in the EU made deterrence and intervention 
impossible irrespective of whether a CFSP on Bosnia had emerged.234 
The self-paralysis of the EU killed the moderate Europeanist progress 
of ESDI and the WEU and, while it bolstered the Atlanticist idea of 
WEU as European pillar of NATO and defense arm of EU rather than 
more ambitious nucleus of the European Army, European failures in 
Bosnia subjected ESDI to limited evolution in the context of the U.S. 
veto in the North Atlantic Counci1.235 More importantly, this raised 
sobering questions as to whether and to what extent the U.S. could 
remain involved in collective security in Western Europe and what, if 
any, role the EU should play in NATO.236 
2. Rebuilding the European Pillar 
So piqued was French interest in NATO that many WEU mem-
bers questioned how serious France was about the WEU. In building 
on the 1993 Franco-German agreement that spelled out the condi-
tions under which EUROCORPS could serve NATO, France effec-
tively already had ended the military rivalry between NATO and the 
WEU. However, by joining the NATO Military Committee and placing 
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its troops in the troop monitoring and implementation force (IFOR) 
under NATO command in December 1995, France accelerated the 
"NATOization" of the WEU.237 Nevertheless, in building on its Com-
mon Concept on European Security of November 1995, the WEU 
stressed the need not only for closer relationships with NATO but also 
for the independent intelligence and airlift capacity necessary to en-
able the assumption of unique and primary responsibilities for Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe. As the WEU Council indicated, "[iJn the 
present strategic environment, Europe's security is not confined to 
security in Europe. Europe has acquired the capability to make its 
own contribution to ajust and peaceful world order."238 
Still, both pillars of the Alliance were consumed with preserving 
the fiction of some parallel Europe-boosting process following the 
completion and ratification of the CJTF concept in June 1996 with the 
Berlin Communique (Berlin) at the NATO Berlin meetings. Berlin 
made it clear that the U.S. would not allow itself to be marginalized in 
the European security realm: while Berlin urged development of 
ESDI and agreed that future missions would require more flexible 
plans and a greater contribution from European politico-military 
command structures to address both Article V and non-Article V mis-
sions, NATO insisted upon a single multinational command structure 
subordinate to the North Atlantic Council and by requiring that ESDI 
evolve within the CJTF concept, demanded that the Europeans create 
militarily coherent and effective forces to relieve the burden on the 
U.S.239 
So ordered, the WEU turned away from its technical muddling 
and· diligently bent to actualizing its operational capabilities. By 
autumn, while it still was not ready for "hard" combat missions and 
still controlled no standing forces,24o the WEU could boast of six na-
tional contributions to multinational organic ground (EUROCORPS 
and EUROFOR Rapid Deployment Forces), naval (EUROMARFOR 
and UK-Netherlands Amphibious Forces) ,241 and air (EURO AIR 
GROUP)242 units available to WEU-Ied Petersberg tasks and to NATO 
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under the double-hatting concept.243 Although the WEU continued to 
build a defense planning cell, satellite interpretation center, crisis 
situations center, and security studies program to close the technology 
gap and enhance its future potential for independent planning and 
analysis,244 the European pillar of NATO appeared to have settled into 
and, more importantly, accepted its limited role as such. By the end of 
the year, the debates within the European pillar centered upon 
whether the follow-on-force to IFOR, the stabilization force (SFOR), 
would become a more European force along the lines of the CJTF245 
and whether the EU quest to act consistently and coherently in inter-
national relations could ever overcome the clash of foreign policy cul-
tures. However, the EU 1996--1997 Intergovernmental Conference, 
originally convened March 29, 1996 to revise Maastricht in order to 
resolve problems with CFSP and ESDI,246 elected instead to subsume 
development of foreign and security policy in favor of more general 
discussions as to the broadening and deepening of the union. 247 
Although, in January 1997, the U.S. proclaimed that it must re-
main an engaged continental power in order to preserve European 
stability,248 U.S. troops in Europe numbered fewer than one hundred 
thousand, their lowest strength post-World War II,249 and the Euro-
pean Commission now "resembl[ed] Amnesty International, with the 
Swedes and Finns joining the other moralists, the Dutch and the 
Danes. "250 Further, although the U.S. foreign policy establishment 
claimed that NATO was the "necessary vehicle enabling the United 
States to play its role as world power,"251 the intellectual force of the 
neoisolationist arguments of many U.S. observers who began to chip 
away at the axiomatic meta-importance of the Alliance. If NATO was 
to serve any useful post-Cold War purpose and survive the calls by a 
sizable segment of the U.S. for its elimination,252 its European pillar 
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simply had to be able to secure a U.S.-brokered peace in the center of 
its own continent with its own ample resources. 
Even for adherents to the opposing multilateral institutional the-
ory that the most important post-Bosnian project was building a 
European pillar at the continental level inclusive of the fonner War-
saw Pact states, Russia presented vehement objections to the expan-
sion of NATO into the gray zone between Germany and the former 
Soviet frontiers.253 Although Alliance advocates claimed that the pro-
posed NATO enlargement was geared toward preventing future Bos-
nias and not directed against Russia, Russians made the meritorious 
counterarguments that OSCE (as CSCE has been renamed), a much 
more diverse and inclusive organization, could soothe ethnic tensions 
and facilitate reconstruction in a far less threatening fashion.254 As 
one commentator reminded the expansionists within the Alliance co-
terie, "NATO is not some kind of all-purpose talk-shop; it is the most 
powerful military alliance the world has ever seen. Its expansion east-
wards must mean a substantial shift in the balance of power with un-
mistakable military implications."255 Consequently, in early 1997, not 
only was a rudderless and near-leaderless NATO struggling to find a 
raison d'etre, but the proposed enlargement of its European pillar was 
still little more than a paper facade. On the expansionist course it had 
set in reaction to Bosnia and tlle failure of its European pillar, NATO 
seemed inexorably committed to drawing its members into one.256 
3. Treaty of Amsterdam 
Lukewarm European efforts to address the vacuum of purpose 
and power in collective Western security, however, fell short once 
again. When Europeanist France and Germany, despite acknowledg-
ing NATO primacy,257 renewed their intermittent efforts at the June 
16-17 Amsterdam Summit to merge tlle WEU and the EU,258 not only 
did the UK, Denmark, Portugal, the Netherlands, the Euroneutrals, 
and the observers259 join to block Italian and Belgian support of a 
253 Henry S. Rowen, The Unm·taill Flltllre of the Allanlic Alliallct'. in REFLECTIONS ON 
EUROPE, supra note 25, at 125, 143. 
254 FRED CHERNOFF, AFTER BIPOLARITY: THE '~"'NISHING THREAT, THEORIES OF COOP-
ERATION, AND THE FUTURE OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE 253 (1995). 
255 Bark, supra note 25, at 41. 
256 CONRY, supra note 5, at 13. 
257 BIRCH, slljJra note 18, at 3. 
258 DINAN, supra note 33, at 487. 
259 VAN EEKELEN, supra note 4, at 61. 
58 Boston College /Iltematiollal & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 24: 1:~ 
phased integration of a reinforced WEU replete with mechanisms to 
permit full participation by neutrals with a threatened veto,260 but the 
Franco-German proposal also fostered the conclusion that while a 
United Europe had gone far in the economic dimension, the failure 
of the EU to make significant progress in foreign policy and defense 
might generate sufficient mistrust to yield U.S. disengagement and 
strand Western Europe on the shoals of insecurity and unmanageable 
change. 
By July 1997, the WEU had traveled only slightly further down 
the road toward self-discovery than it had prior to SEA or TEU as evi-
denced by its "Declaration on the Role of WEU and its Relations with 
the EU and the Atlantic Alliance": 
WEU is an integral part of the development of the European 
Union, providing the Union with access to an operational 
capability, notably in the context of the Petersberg tasks, and 
is an essential element of the development of the European 
Security and Defense Identity within the Atlantic Alliance. 
When the Union avails itself of WEU, WEU will elaborate 
and implement decisions and actions of the EU which have 
defense implications. Cooperation between WEU and NATO 
will continue to evolve, also taking account of the adaptation 
of the Alliance. WEU will develop its role as the politico-
military body for crisis management, contribute to the pro-
gressive framing of a common defense policy and carry for-
ward its concrete implementation through the further de-
velopment of its own operational role. 261 
Nevertheless, the discharge of the WEU responsibility to be the 
Western European crisis manager outside the territorial area covered 
by the Washington Treaty, as evidenced by Bosnia, remained grossly 
inadequate, and the WEU had complicated the policy vacuum by ced-
ing all serious contemplation of collective defense to national gov-
ernments and to the political institutions of the EU. Demands that 
the WEU be allowed to die in peace mounted.262 However, deter-
mined to remedy the problem and definitively actualize the institu-
tional position of the WEU in the hope of complementing the EU 
with a range of economic, political, diplomatic, and military responses 
260 lr!. at 275. 
261 Td. at 273-74. 
262 ld. at 327. 
2000] The (Dis)integmtioll of the EU 59 
for the management of future crises, the European Council pressed 
the issue in Amsterdam and, after a difficult several months of nego-
tiations, nominally denatured the policy dispute with the signing of 
the Treaty of Amsterdam of October 2, 1997 (Amsterdam). While 
some might argue that, as a result of the lessons of Yugoslavia, Am-
sterdam was a successful attempt to integrate the WEU and EU, under 
closer inspection it is plain that Amsterdam failed to even attempt to 
reach a consensus on the relationship between the WEU and EU, as 
members still could opt out from participation in a CFSP action on 
the claim of a vital interest in Article ].13.2 and, in so doing, end the 
process of deliberation. 263 
Although Amsterdam substituted an entirely new Title V for TEU 
Title V, by retaining the unanimity provision for "important" foreign 
policy decisions in Article ].13.2 and thereby failing to transfer com-
petence from the individual Member States to tlle EU,264 Amsterdam 
instead transformed into convenient legal cover the hortatory phrases 
of TEU encouraging Member States to cooperate in foreign and secu-
rity policies. Amsterdam did not confer legal personality on the EU 
and, thus, may require separate ratification by each member to any 
agreement concluded by the European CounciJ.265 Despite differenti-
ating the WEU membership by adding Eastern and Central European 
associates and partners and stimulating a richer post-Bosnia discus-
sion, by abdicating responsibility for induction of Western European 
cooperation in foreign and security policies to the rancorous envi-
ronment of the WEU Assembly and by missing the opportunity to se-
riously address the thorny issue of incorporation of the WEU, Am-
sterdam offered little hope for substantial near-term progress either 
in the evolution of CFSP as a pillar of the EU or in the maturation of 
the WEU as defense arm of the EU.266 
4. NATO: Out-of-Area or Out of Business 
By the beginning of 1998, NATO faced mounting obstacles that 
threatened to derail its SFOR mission. NATO nonetheless sought to 
prove that it was still the abiding symbol of Western unity and deter-
263 See Manin, supra note 137, at 17. 
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mination267 and that, given another Bosnia, it would act decisively and 
quickly.268 Not only did Russia indicate that it would remain in Bosnia 
after SFOR, thereby presaging an attempt to restore the Balkans to 
the historic Russian sphere-of-influence, but the WEU also was under 
heavy and sustained Russian criticism of its efforts to draw Central 
and Eastern European states into affiliation with the EU and its insti-
tutions.269 
The U.S., convinced that the fumbling Europeans would never 
remain in Bosnia should it terminate its participation in SFOR and 
certain that chaos would ensue in Bosnia in the absence of Western 
forces to counter the Russian presence,270 but still foundering with no 
coherent out-of-area policy to address looming crises in Poland, 
Moldova, and Hungary,271 ceased discussing deadlines for SFOR alto-
gether and scaled back expectations for NATO expansion. Mean-
while, the Western Europeans, still with no functional CFSP and still 
unable to resolve pressing post-Cold War questions of how to adjudi-
cate competing claims to sovereignty and self-determination within 
the internal boundaries of a multiethnic state, fell asleep on the watch 
as Kosovo, now the worst minority problem in Europe, tumbled into 
anarchy. 
III. The Fall of Yugoslavia: Act Two-Kosovo 
A. Bosnia Redux: Humanitarian Crisis, UN Paralysis, REU Exclusion, 
Russian Intrusion, NATO Confusion 
1. Breaking Promises: The Abrogation of Kosovar Territorial 
Autonomy 
The territory of Kosovo is the cradle of the Serbian church, the 
birthplace of the medieval Serbian nation, and legally a province of 
the modern nation-state of Serbia following its 1913 cession from the 
Ottoman Empire. However, shifts in demographic patterns altered the 
political balance and, by the outbreak of World War I, ethnic Serbs 
were a minority in Kosovo, while Kosovar Albanian Muslims were a 
disenfranchised, subjugated majority. Although the Tito-era fugoslav 
267 MANDELBAUM, supra note 89, at viii. 
268 [d. at 42. 
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Federal Constitution endowed the Kosovar Albanians with collective 
territorial autonomy in recognition of their majority status and their 
vociferous claim to nationhood, following the death of Tito an in-
creasingly radicalized Serb minority progressively stripped non-Serbs 
of their national rights, convincing restive Kosovar Albanians that 
their rights as a people could never be secured under Serbian rule 
and that their autonomy must be parlayed into statehood. In the late 
1980s, a series of increasingly repressive measures by the YUgoslav fed-
eral government of President Slobodan Milosevic sparked labor 
strikes and violent popular demonstrations to which Yugoslavia re-
sponded with the February 27, 1989 declaration of a "state of emer-
gency," imposition of martial law and, via an action illegal even under 
the Yugoslav federal constitution,272 the March 23,1990 abrogation of 
the autonomy of Kosovo.273 
As Yugoslavia moved to nip Kosovar Albanian nationalism in the 
bud, the situation in Kosovo swiftly deteriorated. When Yugoslav ac-
tions in support of the Bosnian Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia threat-
ened to spark pan-Balkan war, President Bush warned in December 
1992 that the V.S. would be prepared to use military force against the 
Serbs, suggesting that the inviolability of Kosovo as part of Serbia 
proper could not be presumed where the V.S. and its Western allies 
prodded into intervention. The Clinton Administration issued a simi-
lar warning in March 1993 following the Yugoslav eviction of the 
CSCE mission in response to the condemnation of "Serb oppression" 
of the Kosovar Albanians by that organization. Although international 
attention shifted to Bosnia for the next several years, by 1996 Kosovo 
once again was the foremost item on the Balkan agenda of Western 
collective security managers. On March 30 of that year, former V.S. 
Ambassador Warren Zimmerman endorsed the partition of KosovO.274 
In August, the V.S. Congress passed a resolution championing "self-
determination" for Kosovo and calling for the appointment of a V.S. 
envoy to the province, underscoring the evolution of V.S. political 
support for a negotiated settlement to include the possibility of parti-
tion and independence.275 However, in response to the Yugoslav sup-
pression of prmince-wide popular demonstrations and acts of civil 
272 See Ted Baggett, Human Rights Abuses in Yugoslavia: To Blillg all End to Political Op-
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disobedience, the West offered nothing more forceful by way of pro-
test against Yugoslav conduct than the statement by U.S. Envoy to the 
Balkans Robert Gelbrand, simultaneously accusing Serb authorities of 
responsibility for the violence and rejecting independence for Kosovo 
and the demand from the EU that Yugoslavia restore provincial 
autonomy.276 In February 1998, the long-suffering Kosovar Albanians 
seized the opportunity to lecture the international community in the 
unwelcome lesson that autonomy and human rights are meaningful 
only in states that respect the rule-of-Iaw by voting for independ-
ence277 and calling down upon themselves the wrath of the JNA.278 
2. Inaction in the Face of Genocide: Coup de Grace for UN Collective 
Security 
When a vicious JNA offensive on February 28, 1998 against the 
Kosovo Liberation Army (KIA) somehow caught the West by surprise 
and destroyed the nucleus of the Kosovar Albanian resistance, the 
Kosovar Albanian population was rendered ripe for yet another geno-
cidal campaign at the hands of the regular army, paramilitaries, and 
civilian brigands.279 However, whereas prior to this date the atrocities 
committed by Serbian and \'ilgoslav forces were evaluated against the 
derogable norms of international human rights law, with the more 
experienced KLA now waging an ongoing armed insurgency and con-
trolling large swaths of territory, the situation had surpassed the 
threshold of an "armed conflict" and thus invoked the nonderogable 
protections of Article 3 and Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions 
and the customary laws of war.280 Moreover, the Kosovar Albanians 
voted on March 22, 1998 to re-elect the shadow government of self-
styled President of the Republic of Kosovo, Ibrahim Rugova. On 
March 31, 1998, the UN Security Council found with Resolution 1160 
that the crisis in Kosovo "amounted to a threat to international peace 
and security" and, although the UN took no immediate further action 
and although Yugoslavia nursed stalled bilateral negotiations along 
until their preordained demise in May, by late spring the KLA 
prompted the U.S. and the EU to reimpose the sanctions on Yugosla-
via that had been progressively lifted in order to reward fugoslavia's 
276 See id. at 403. 
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compliance with Dayton.281 Although the U.S. was the only NATO 
member that took the position that NATO did not require explicit 
UN Security Council authorization to use force in Kosovo,282 and al-
though a chastened Rugova dropped his demand for international 
mediators and prepared to accept the Yugoslav conditional offer of 
restoration of territorial autonomy, the KLA surged to the political 
fore by withdrawing its support for Rugova and refusing to negotiate 
for anything less than independence. 283 
By late summer, the desperate Kosovar Albanians won a m~or 
victory with the September 23, 1998 passage of UN Security Council 
Resolution 1199 that condemned those Yugoslav actions in Kosovo 
that were causing an enormous humanitarian disaster and that de-
manded that Yugoslavia cease its assaults on civilians. Although the 
failure of Resolution 1199 to explicitly mention that the use of force 
was the basis for a Russian vote in its favor, Yugoslavia acceded to 
Western demands for a cease-fire that briefly halted the humanitarian 
disaster. Nevertheless, by early October, Yugoslavia violated the cease-
fire and sparked ethnic Albanian demands for Western humanitarian 
intervention. By October 15, the Kosovar Albanians had rejected a 
U.S.-negotiated autonomy plan (Hill Plan). The principal reasons for 
the rejection were that the Hill Plan would have postponed discussion 
of the final status of Kosovo for three years, diluted the legal personal-
ity of Kosovo, and locked Kosovo into autonomy rather than inde-
pendence, as its status could be modified only at the end of the three-
year period with the consent of all parties. Although Serbia indicated 
as a counteroffer that it was v.rilling to accede to a reduction-in-forces 
agreement (to levels existing prior to the February 28, 1998 offensive) 
monitored not by the ,,\TEU but by two thousand unarmed civilian ob-
servers from the OSCE, Rugova proclaimed that NATO ground com-
bat troops, in conjunction Vlrith the availability of NATO air strikes, 
were essential for enforcement of the cease-fire and protection of 
ethnic Albanians, while leaders of Kosovo Albanian nationalist parties 
rejected any deal outright. On October 20, when no agreement based 
on the Hill Plan could be fashioned, a third lll~or Serb offensive 
steamrolled across Kosovo. 
In the tense UN Security Council on October 21, member states, 
in disagreement not only about the causes of the war in Kosovo but 
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also about the principles at stake could not agree as to whether the 
Kosovar Albanians were entitled to exercise a right to self-
determination, and the West could not overcome Russian and Chi-
nese objections to even the implicit threat of force to back a potential 
accord predicated upon the withdrawal of Serbian military and para-
military forces from Kosovo, let alone NATO humanitarian interven-
tion in what Russia and China continued to insist was an internal 
Yugoslav affair. Irrespective of the merits of the Western claim that 
ongoing genocide and other widespread and systematic violations of 
human rights in Kosovo justified humanitarian intervention, military 
action was contraindicated in the absence of explicit UN Security 
Council authorization that clearly indicated the objectives and tenni-
nated with the establishment of a permanent cease-fire. 
However, the U.S. and its Western allies intimated that simply be-
cause the principle of humanitarian intervention permits of abuse 
does not dictate that it will be abused in a specific instance284 and that, 
in instances of genocide, it would be absurdly legalistic to await UN 
Security Council approval. 285 Continuing along this vein, the West 
contended that an alternative to explicit authorization was essential. 
In the stead of authorization, the West proposed that a de minimis 
threshold could serve as a basic trigger and reference point that 
would regulate the right to humanitarian intervention and serve as a 
source of implicit authorization in practice. According to the West, 
implied authorization can be gleaned from the acquiescence or am-
bivalence of the UN Security Council in refusing to impose sanctions. 
Thus, member states creatively may construe the UN purpose to 
maintain international peace and security as granting approval for 
and even creating an obligation to take forceful action to preserve 
order by removing threats to the peace posed by the transborder ef-
fects of massive human rights abuses in the absence of effective UN 
action to do so. 
Russian and Chinese obstruction shifted to the impending threat 
of NATO airs trikes in response to the flagrant Yugoslav violation of 
the cease-fire and disengagement agreement for which NATO 
claimed authorization under Resolution 1199 and Article 52 of the 
28<1 Dino Kritsiotis, RealJIJmising Policy Objections to Hllmanitarian Intervention, 19 MICH. J. 
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UN Charter.286 Although by October 24 no specific UN Security 
Council resolution authorizing NATO to use force on behalf of the 
Kosovar Albanians had managed to slip through the Sino-Russian dip-
lomatic screen, NATO nevertheless insisted that Resolution 1199 had 
provided the legal basis for the Alliance to take action under Article 
52 provided that the UN Security Council did not first take effective 
measures and provided that NATO did not threaten the territorial 
integrity or political independence of Yugoslavia. However, Sino-
Russian diplomacy prevented any UN Security Council Chapter VII 
resolution specifically endorsing NATO airstrikes requiring NATO, in 
order to extend its October activation order indefinitely, to return to 
allied governments for unanimous approval under a cloud of Sino-
Russian claims that NATO airs trikes were precluded via seisin of the 
matter by the UN Security Council notwithstanding its inaction there-
tofore and, alternatively, violative of the geographic limits of the 
NATO Charter. 
3. Enter the Alliance: "Last Hurrah" for the Regional Organizational 
Approach, or "With or Without WEU" 
Concluding that the whole of Chapters VII and VIII of the UN 
Charter belonged to the political realm and were incapable of meas-
urement by traditional legal instruments, NATO, rather than turn to 
the unreliable WEU, elected for the first time in its history to progres-
sively interpret the UN Charter to couch its threatened offensive mili-
tary action against a sovereign state as a humanitarian intervention by 
a multilateral organization in a situation of grave human rights viola-
tions. Sino-Russian obstructionism imploded in the increasingly ir-
relevant UN, and internal divisions mended themselves within the 
Alliance. Soon, U.S.-led Western diplomacy backed by credible NATO 
military threats drove the Serbs on October 25 to accept the Hol-
brooke Agreement, to dismantle roadblocks, and to retreat into their 
barracks and ushered Kosovar Albanians back into their villages un-
der a new and more durable cease-fire agreement to which the UN 
Security Council accorded its imprimatur. 
Nevertheless, experience had taught the West to be cautious of 
Serbia, particularly in the absence of a permanent agreement en-
forceable through a military balance of power and in a climate where 
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adherence to the inviolability of the borders of Kosovo simply would 
solidity the Serbian claim while perpetuating ethnic animosity.287 
Whereas the West had succeeded in backing cohesive diplomacy with 
a credible military threat, there were no Western troops on the 
ground to prevent an endless string of broken cease-fires should 
Yugoslavia seek to renegotiate the agreement. Further, Russia had 
been relegitimized and reinvigorated as a great power by Dayton and 
now appeared poised to launch a drive to exploit any power vacuum 
the West allowed to develop in Eastern Europe. Russian fervor in 
support of the Orthodox faith and the Slavic people could not be 
precluded forever, and the deep and unrelenting doubts over the in-
tentions of Russia and its Serbian ally bled into Kosovo despite the 
uneasy truce that held intermittently throughout the remainder of 
the year. 
B. European Break from the Alliance? From l1EU To a European Army 
1. Legitimating the European Security and Defense Initiative 
Recognizing that the Kosovo affair was unfinished business, the 
EU, with its familiar tired refrain directed this time by an alliance of 
the Labor-governed UK and France, called its first-ever meeting of 
defense ministers on November 4 to consider once again how its 
members might strengthen cooperation in the defense arena without 
undermining NATO. All agreed that Western Europeans "simply have 
to be willing and able to come to grips with European crises and 
conflicts, if necessary by our own efforts-before hundreds of thou-
sands of people have been killed and millions have been driven from 
their homes" and that a "more effective military capability" was neces-
sary to "give the EU a stronger voice in the world" through a "real" 
CFSP.288 The defense ministers, in addition to their call for closer EU 
links with the vVEU, agreed that better coordination of multinational 
forces and more harmonization of defense procurement through the 
WEU were essential to achieving rapid reaction operational capacity 
so that when the EU decided upon a collective political will it would 
be "connected to a system and a capability that can deliver. "289 Non-
EU members of the "VEU, concerned that the EU was attempting to 
undermine the role of NATO as the primary consultative platform for 
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problems concerning European security and defense, found no reas-
surance in the first-ever joint NATO-v\TEU seminar on crisis manage-
ment held in Brussels in early February 1999 for, in the period pre-
ceding the April NATO Washington Summit, the Chairman of the 
WEU Assembly, Luis Maria de Puig, proclaimed that the joint WEU-
EU objective would be to adjust institutional arrangements and define 
common interests to produce an effective independent action plan to 
"break the monopoly of the U.S., which is trying to resolve the Kosovo 
problem in its own way. "290 
2. Collapse of Rambouillet and Implosion of the European Pillar 
An uneasy truce lasted for most of the winter throughout Kosovo; 
however, when renewed negotiations held in Rambouillet, France un-
der the auspices of the French and British-led Contact Group pro-
duced the Rambouillet Accords (Rambouillet), the Kosovo Crisis 
reached an unresolvable impasse. Thus, on March 19 the Contact 
Group concluded that discussion would end unless the Serbs ac-
cepted Rambouillet and that, while remaining seized of the issue, the 
Contact Group now would turn the matter over to NATO for military 
action. 
With the WEU having failed to anticipate and stave off the 
Kosovo Crisis, and with EU diplomatic efforts through the Contact 
Group defeated, once again Western Europe forfeited an independ-
ent role in resolving a European crisis to the U.S-dominated NATO 
Alliance. So abominable was the role of CFSP and the WEU in articu-
lating and exercising even a limited common role in combating law-
lessness and upholding minimal humanitarian standards that the 
WEU Secretary General, Jose Cutiliero, pronounced the continued 
existence of his organization in jeopardy and encouraged claims that 
the v\TEU had succeeded only in teaching Europe and the rest of the 
world that the U.S. was the key to European stability.291 
An even greater source of disconsolation was the failure of the 
European members of the Alliance to preserve solidarity within the 
Alliance as to the optimal military strategy to be employed to force 
Yugoslav capitulation to NATO demands. Claiming as its lodestar the 
fulfillment of an obligation to avert a humanitarian disaster and pre-
vent a wider conflict, NATO, now wholly under the strategic direction 
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of the U.S., initiated Operation ALLIED FORCE on March 24 with 
the tactical application of coalition airpower against specific military 
and industrial targets in Kosovo and "Serbia proper" for the express 
purpose of degrading the military capacity of Yugoslavia and securing 
the conditions for peace. In a national address justifying U.S. partici-
pation in the NATO action, President Clinton explained that "we 
learned that in the Balkans, inaction in the face of brutality simply 
invites more brutality, but firmness can stop armies and save lives" and 
that the U.S. and its allies "must apply that lesson in Kosovo" and 
"stand united for peace. "292 Nevertheless, by indicating that a ground 
invasion of Yugoslavia was not under consideration,293 the Clinton 
Administration inexplicably violated a key military principle that pro-
scribes indicating intentions to an opponent and in so doing gave a 
green light to further genocide by the JNA. When the murder and 
expulsion of ethnic Albanians expanded exponentially in late March 
and early April, European NATO members could not agree to a land 
invasion as was necessary to comport with Alliance decisional rules as 
well as to permit the assembly and deployment of forces with ade-
quate time to complete the mission prior to the onset of the Balkan 
winter. Worse, insufficient unified European political will prevented 
the Alliance from damaging the Serb military sufficiently to force a 
genuine surrender. As the air campaign wore on without demonstra-
ble success, European states began to soften their support, with 
France, Belgium, Italy, and Greece openly calling for a halt to the 
bombing.294 Only the UK stood ready to unconditionally support the 
Alliance. 
By late May, only the UK openly discussed the need to dispatch 
ground forces in anything other than a peacekeeping capacity, prom-
ising to do "whatever it takes" to create an honorable peace, and sug-
gested the possibility of a European invasion even in the absence of a 
vacillating and squeamish U.S.295 However, whereas the Netherlands, 
Norway, Spain, and Denmark weakly backed the current strategy, 
Germany publicly opposed the use of ground troops, Portugal ruled 
out the use of its troops in a ground campaign, and Hungary ruled 
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out its territory as a staging point for an inyasion. Despite the claims 
of NATO Secretary General Javier Solana that the air campaign was 
working and should be continued, U.S. critics proclaimed that the 
bombing was a failure and that future success was unlikely. Although 
NATO officially announced that the Alliance was holding together, 
cracks became chasms with the May 27 ICTFY indictment of Milose\-ic 
for planning, instigating, executing, and aiding deportation and 
murder of Koso\'o Albanians. This indictment forced U.S. Deputy 
Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, Russian Special Envoy Viktor Cher-
nomyrdin, and Finnish President Martti Alltisaari, currently discuss-
ing a political settlement, into the awkward situation of negotiating 
with an indicted war crimes suspect. The U.S. insisted, over the objec-
tions of France and several other Western European states that 
Milosevic be captured and surrendered for trial as part of any resolu-
tion to the Kosovo Crisis. When Yugoslav forces breached Dayton with 
impunity by forcing entry into Bosnia to temporarily detain and inter-
rogate six NATO peacekeepers on May 30,296 it became apparent that 
not only would NATO lose tlle war in Kosovo and fail to prevent the 
collapse of Dayton and the resumption of wider armed conflict across 
and even beyond the Balkans, but also that the very future of the Alli-
ance under U.S. leadership hung in the balance. As the British De-
fense Secretary George· Robertson was forced to conclude, "[iJn 
Kosovo, we have all come face to face with the European future, and it 
is frightening. "297 
3. Cologne Undercuts the Alliance but "Rescues" United Europe 
As the Alliance teetered on the Kosovar fulcrum, EU leaders 
huddled in Cologne for their annual midyear summit on June 3 with 
their official agenda the long-term economic development of the Bal-
kans as a means to bring the region closer to the European political 
mainstream. However, sterner subjects dominated the discussions. 
With the reduced U.S. presence in Europe no longer mesmerizing its 
leftist/federalist member governments, the UK no longer so paranoid 
about Europe, Germany able to deploy troops abroad, and Europeans 
maintaining more soldiers under arms than the U.S., the EU found 
the impetus to construct the Europeanist "post-Washington" era of 
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common European security on a "London-Paris-Berlin" axis.298 Con-
sequently, on the opening day of the Cologne Summit (Cologne), the 
EV, unwilling to accept a NATO-derived ESDI with "all the military 
significance of an air ambulance and over which it would have no real 
political control beyond the capacity to 'request' the WEV to conduct 
this or that operation,"299 brushed aside earlier Atlanticist suggestions 
to merely reinforce the partnership with an autonomous WEV and 
Europeanist suggestions to strengthen the legal power Amsterdam 
granted the European Council in tasking the WEV, brashly declaring 
instead that it would capitalize upon Maastricht and radically overhaul 
the Alliance to end the "senseless triple co-existence" of NATO, the 
EV, and the WEV by incorporating the twenty-one nation WEV 
within the EV in order that its use as a NATO CJTF backed by a CFSP 
would come to be seen on both sides of the Atlantic as preferable to 
the ineffectual ad hoc coalitions deployed in Bosnia and now 
Kosovo.300 
Further, in recognizing that the historic unwillingness of its 
members to make the expenditures necessary to develop strategic air-
lift and intelligence-gathering and analysis capacity or joint command-
and-control prevented emergence of a serious ESDI, with Cologne the 
EV resolved that Western European members of NATO would shed 
their reliance on V.S. airlift and intelligence assets. Accordingly, EV 
Member States resolved to give the European Vnion the necessary 
means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a 
common European policy on security and defense by disposing of the 
need for the WEV by the end of 2000 through development of con-
vergence criteria301 and Council supervision of finn juridical and po-
litical commitments302 to govern institutional convergence of the two 
institutions. 
Although the EV quickly and adamantly denied any attempt to 
undermine NATO, and despite the earlier conclusion by NATO Sec-
retary General Javier Solana that the move would "strengthen the 
European defense status" and "pave the way for a more mutually bal-
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anced security partnership, "303 in fact, with U.S. engagement no 
longer guaranteeing all its security needs, the EU boldly chose opera-
tional independence by agreeing to eliminate dependency on the 
NATO-CJTF concept, develop a legitimate ESDI, incorporate the 
WEU within a supranational European defense effort, and transform 
its political structure in the direction of a federal European super-
power.304 With Cologne, the European pillar took a giant step toward 
military independence by formally creating EUROCORPS as a per-
manent multinational FAWEU standing force of 60,000 headquar-
tered at Strasbourg. As additional evidence of its independence, the 
EU further eroded NATO primacy by claiming Solana its first foreign 
policy czar and granting him the authority to act independently on 
behalf of the EU in diplomacy and defense matters. 
Although Cologne presented little more than a cumbersome and 
opaque vision for a future independent European response to a re-
gional crisis, its gist was unmistakable: Europe claimed to be serious, 
at least to the level of detailed theoretical explication, about taking 
independent politico-military command and control of the strategic 
direction of future European regional crises and about spending 
whatever vast resources this would require.305 
C. The Kosovo Peace Plan: The End of NATO As We Knew It? 
The cornered U.S.-led NATO accepted on June 3 the Ahti-
saari/Chernomyrdin Plan (KPP) drafted by the Group of Seven in-
dustrialized nations and Russia to preserve the Alliance and present 
the fiction of victory. Although KPP guaranteed in theory each of the 
points for which NATO had initiated Operation ALLIED FORCE and 
resembled Dayton in terms of a scheduled deployment of fifty thou-
sand NATO peacekeepers with responsibilities for national recon-
struction and repatriation of hundreds of tllOusands of refugees, and 
although the mandate for international supervision of civilian im-
plementation was issued under the coercive authority of Chapter VII, 
Chinese efforts to dilute the NATO role resulted in the weak language 
that provides that the "essential NATO participation ... under a 
unified control and command and authorized to secure [a] safe envi-
ronment for all the residents in Kosovo and enable the safe return of 
the displaced persons and refugees to tlleir homes" will occur not un-
303 DEUTSCHE-PRESSE AGENTUR. May 10, 1999, at l. 
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der NATO supreme control, but rather under the "auspices of the 
UN,"306 thereby subjecting the implementation efforts of the Kosovo 
Implementation Force (KFOR) to Chinese and Russian vetoes in the 
contentious Security Council. Moreover, as a further demonstration of 
the hollowness of the ''victory'' of a divided NATO, Resolution 1244 
(1244), essentially Rambouillet reformatted, might have been secured 
had further negotiations within the Rambouillet framework been 
pressed past Russian objections by the Contact Group in March. Most 
distressing of all, no sooner had the ink dried on the Russian-drafted 
1244 than the conduct of the supposedly vanquished Yugoslav gov-
ernment called into question whether it would be possible without 
ground combat to create essential autonomy and an economically se-
cure future for repatriated Kosovo Albanians under the de jure control 
of the government that had terrorized them in the first place and was 
now claiming victory over the very forces sent to protect them. 
On June 14, the inability of either the UN or NATO to quash 
Russian demands for a role in the enforcement of KPP, independent 
of the KFOR command, invited an armored column of Russian 
"peacekeepers" to block the access of forces sent to secure the Prishna 
airport despite the assurances of the Yeltsin government that Russia 
would not dispatch troops unless and until a participation agreement 
was reached with NATO. By early July, Russia felt emboldened enough 
by NATO disunity to attempt to force a revision of the June agree-
ment to permit the stationing of its forces in sectors of Kosovo con-
trolled by NATO member-states and, thereby, to dilute the tenor of 
NATO operational command. 
By mid:July, running gun battles, sniper attacks, and grenade and 
mortar bombardments on military and civilian targets had broken out 
across the U.S. sector, and it became clear to U.S. Chairman of the 
Joint Staff Shelton, U.S. Defense Secretary Cohen, and KFOR field 
commanders tl1at the traditionally equipped and trained peacekeep-
ing forces would require the rapid augmentation by a local police 
force promised in Rambouillet, but theretofore absent in Kosovo. 
With the UN imposing upon KFOR to not only preserve the cease-fire 
but also to provide police services and run aspects of a civil admini-
stration the UN had yet to launch, the frustrated Clinton Administra-
tion soon waxed critical: Defense Secretary Cohen and General Clark 
306 Press Release, United Nations Security Council, Sec1tlity Council Welcoming Yugosla-
via's Acceptance of Peace Plinciples, AI/thO/ius CilJiI, Secll1ity Presence in Kosollo, SCj6686 (June 
10,1999). 
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blamed NATO allies for having hindered the logical prosecution of 
the war by failing to preserve outward political consensus while chas-
tising European members of KFOR for compromising even the poor 
peace NATO had secured by cutting defense budgets and refusing to 
assume a proportionate share of the military burden. Furthermore, 
the framers of KPP, by failing to specify with precision the final status 
of Kosovo and the mechanisms whereby NATO protection of ethnic 
Albanians would prove so seamless and efficient it would obviate the 
need for any armed KLA presence, sowed the seeds for the perpetual 
renegotiation of their peace plan. As Sullivan remarked, 
like the Dayton agreement that brought peace to Bosnia, 
Kosovo's vague peace plan promises different things to dif-
ferent parties to the conflict. To the Belgrade government, 
the plan means Kosovo will remain an integral part of Yugo-
slavia. But, to the Albanians, the plan represents a step to-
ward independence. Already the different interpretations 
are causing problems. For one thing, the Kosovo Liberation 
Army (KLA) has no intention of giving up its fight for a 
Kosovar state.... Though the agreement with Slobodan 
Milosevic that NATO has been sent to implement did not in-
clude this option, the guerrillas had not been consulted, let 
alone included, in the bargaining-so they can justifiably 
claim not to be bound by it. Indeed, from the moment the 
Serbs agreed to the peace plan, the KLA made it clear that it 
had no intention of giving up its weapons .... In fact, rather 
than demilitarization, the KIA seemed to think that NATO 
is planning to turn the rebel force into a professional 
army.307 
By late July, Kosovo was slipping into the type of anarchy that had 
characterized Albania for a decade, as the KIA made no efforts to 
prevent ethnic Albanians from seeking revenge against the remaining 
ethnic Serbs. The incompetence of KFOR was made manifest by the 
July 30 murders of fourteen Serb farmers and the July 31 demolition 
of a Serbian Orthodox church in Pristina. By the start of August, 
Yugoslavia had begun to amass troops on the Koso\'o border and was 
demanding of KFOR the right to dispatch JNA forces and Serbian po-
lice to accord ethnic Serbs and Serb religious sites the protection 
KFOR appeared unable to provide. KFOR member governments, un-
307 A. Sullivan, In Control-Kosollo DisjJatch, THE NE\\' REpUBLIC,Jul. 5, 1999, at 16. 
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willing to learn the lessons of Dayton and more aggressively enforce 
the peace, risked forever forfeiting the opportunity to capitalize upon 
the cease-fire with democratization and refugee return. Russian 
forces, however, detained KIA Chief of Staff Agim Ceku on July 31 
prompting KIA Commander-in-Chief Hashim Thaci to warn that 
ethnic Albanians, enraged at the presence of Russian forces in KFOR, 
would defend themselves. 
The longer refugees remain underserved, ethnic tensions remain 
high, force remains the sole convertible currency, and KPP goes un-
implemented the more the prospects for a more peaceful Balkan fu-
ture dim and the less certain becomes the very continued existence of 
NATO and the European regional collective security system the U.S. 
continues to shepherd. 'Whatever transpires in the near-term future, 
the failure of KFOR to aggressively implement KPP dictates that not 
only Kosovo but also the destabilized and economically stagnant 
Yugoslav successor states as well will remain a diplomatic headache for 
foreseeable future and that progress toward the $31 billion imple-
mentation of economic rehabilitation and refugee return308 will re-
main a chimera. Thus, not only will the disingenuous and dishonor-
able "peace" the EU and the WEU bequeathed Kosovo by default 
prove crushingly evanescent, but ultimate victory over the forces of 
disorder will require far more challenging and onerous commitments 
than the fickle West and its fractious security institutions have proven 
able and willing to undertake in what history may come to call, in part 
as a result of their inadequacies, the end of the post-Cold War era. 
CONCLUSION 
Since its founding in 1948, the WEU has been captive to the vicis-
situdes of the Atanticist-Europeanist Great Debate over the architec-
ture and purpose of Western European collective security and, thus, 
has contributed little to the resolution of the two existential questions 
regarding the aspirational notion of a United Europe: whether West-
ern Europeans could accommodate their national sovereignties to a 
CFSP and, if so, whether they should expend the resources to build 
the military infrastructure required to relieve the burden on the U.S., 
308 Now, BillIor Rebllilding the Bal/wns, WORLD PRESS REv., Sept. 1999, at 14-15. The 
economic costs of intervention are as follows: repair of Nato bomb damage, $99 billion; 
peacekeeping forces, $4.2 billion per year; economic reconstruction, $29 billion for the 
first five years. ld. In short, the total cost for the reconstruction and democratization of the 
former Yugoslavia lllay well exceed $100 billion. ld. 
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lead Western Europe from beneath the shadow of NATO, and trans-
form a customs union with some judicial functions into a truly sover-
eign federal state with complete international personality. With the 
collapse of the European Defense Cooperation, the first of a series of 
failed Europeanist proposals for an enhanced ESDI external to 
NATO, it appeared Europe had answered these interconnected in-
quiries in the negative. By the mid-1950s, the Alliance was cemented 
by the accepted wisdom that any development of ESDI outside the 
subordinate ,,\TEU forum would weaken the U.S. commitment to 
Western Europe through NATO, which alone could manage capably 
the high politics of defense and security while the European project 
tended to economics and commerce. With the trans-Atlantic bargain, 
Western Europe, still recovering from the devastation of World War II, 
accorded the U.S. the role of undisputed hegemonic leader and the 
concomitant freedom to dictate the governing political and military 
strategies of Western European security in exchange for the right to 
free-ride as to the defense burden. However, French aspirations, 
Western European economic recovery, and renewed self-confidence 
cOl~oined to prevent the total sacrifice of European security and de-
fense independence upon the altar of U.S. primacy. Over the next two 
decades, waves of contending Atlanticist attempts to stave off Europe-
anism and permanently resolve the cardinal questions at the core of 
the Great Debate were stymied by diametrically opposed Europeanist 
solutions which passionately if impracticably advocated as sine qua non 
to the eventual integration and liberation of Europe a security and 
defense role apart from NATO. Although the WEU had slipped into a 
politico-military coma by the early 1970s, oil embargoes, trade wars, 
and U.S. global disengagement, by demonstrating the magnitude of 
the trans-Atlantic policy gap and the potential weakness of the U.S. 
commitment to the conventional defense of Europe through NATO, 
opened the door to new discussions regarding a "European voice" in 
security and defense. With the intensification of the Cold War and the 
subsumption of distinct Western European concerns within the su-
perpower confrontation, the Western Europeans shook the WEU out 
of its decades-long slumber. 
Although Article VIII of the Modified Brussels Treaty allowed the 
WEU to act out-of-area, without particularly strong or widely-shared 
sense of ESDI and without a CFSP to guide its tasking, the WEU was 
exposed as a Europeanist fraud. In succeeding months, the WED was 
left to call a succession of summits and meetings wherein it issued a 
series of weak declarations representing little more than the lowest 
common denominator of nationally-defined interests that did nothing 
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to rectify problems in the CFSP process or substantively advance 
European integration even as to the political aspects of security. 
Moreover, fiscal crises confined the "VEU within the NATO cage. 
Deflated Europeanists could offer only mild protests when the Alli-
ance, in shaping its decidedly Atlanticist vision for the post-Cold War 
Western European security system, confined the prospective WEU 
contribution to facilitating relations with those members of the EC 
not yet members of the WEU. 
However, the explosive profusion of security threats, in particular 
the dissolution of Yugoslavia, upset the post-containment Alliance 
consensus and paralyzed interlocking security institutions. The U.S. 
and UN called upon the EC and its institutions to summon a CFSP fit 
to the peaceful resolution of the brewing conflict. However, the opti-
mistic Europeanist majority, busy crowing about Europe's "finest 
hour," miscalculated the degree of political cohesion required to 
shape the behavior of the recalcitrant actors in the Yugoslav crisis, and 
U.S.-condoned efforts to position the WEU as the principle interna-
tional collective security organization in post-Cold War Europe suc-
cumbed to the parallel Atlanticist-European battle for primacy in the 
overarching process of European integration. In such a milieu, the EC 
institutional requirement of foreign policy-defense unanimity exacer-
bated national policy divergences and, in concert with risk aversion, 
fears of Soviet sabre-rattling and of a fundamental inability to syn-
chronize a CFSP prevented the European pillar from tasking the 
WEU. Although Maastricht and TEU forced EC members to commit 
to a CFSP that they could support actively, these latest integrative 
measures provided the WEU not with a mandate but rather with 
guidelines on adaptation to NATO primacy. Thus, when the U.S. 
stubbornly clung to its refusal to commit U.S. ground forces even af-
ter the discovery of credible evidence of genocide, the frazzled EC, 
itself terminally wedded to the politically and morally bankrupt 
Vance-Owen partition plan and paralyzed by internal strife, busied the 
WEU with nothing more significant than the symbolic enforcement of 
embargoes. 
With assertive European multilateralism mortally wounded in the 
Balkan hills, the WEU reached the obvious conclusion that, in the ab-
sence of even a lowest-common denominator CFSP to guide the EC, it 
had no role in Bosnia. Without politico-military crisis management 
capability, diplomatic recognition became the sole instrument with 
which the EC could condition the outcome of war in Bosnia. How-
ever, recognition only served to accelerate the ferocity of the ethllo-
genocidal inferno. With its post-recognition refusal, despite over-
2000] The (Dis)illlegmiioll oflhl' Elf 77 
whelming military superiority relative to the Bosnian Serbs, to inter-
vene to break the deadly siege of Sar~evo forfeited any claim to moral 
legitimacy, catalyzed Serb butchery, and terminated hope for further 
participation in the resolution of the war. Most distressingly, by refus-
ing for two years to admit to its diplomatic blunders and remove its 
national forces from UNPROFOR in order to force the U.S. to enter 
the arena and implement the NATO lift and strike plan, the Euro-
pean pillar facilitated U.S. erosion of Alliance credibility, revealed that 
first-order politico-military problems such as Bosnia were beyond the 
ken of United Europe, and doomed several hundred thousand people 
to death. Bosnia was nearly catastrophic not only to the survival of the 
WEU and the Alliance but also to the peaceful and just evolution of 
the post-Cold War security system in Europe: unable to develop a 
CFSP to guide deployment of the 'VEU or to admit its own incapacity, 
the EU ratified military aggression and forcible population transfers, 
ushered Russian influence back into the Balkans and, by encouraging 
Milosevic, all but guaranteed the Kosovo phase of the conflict. 
Nevertheless, despite the stunning carnage in the wake of its sec-
ond dramatic failure to positively manage an out-of-area crisis, the EU 
fumbled fleeting opportunities to prevent future Bosnias by burying 
the Atlanticist-Europeanist debate and to remedy intra-Alliance rifts, 
choosing instead to dither its way through Amsterdam by avoiding 
both the Scylla of substantively amending CFSP procedures and in-
corporating the ,,\TEU or the Charybdis of committing to loyal Alli-
ance service as a more robust European pillar. The abject failure of 
EU diplomacy to stave off bloodshed in Kosovo through interposition 
of the ,\TEU forfeited to the U.S.-dominated NATO Alliance any inde-
pendent role for Europe in resolving yet a third out-of-area crisis. 
Worse, the political disintegration of the European pillar over the 
harrowing issue of ground combat in the treacherous Balkans forced 
a tottering Alliance at the derivative cost of thousands of additional 
Kosovar Albanian lives. 
A specter is haunting Europe: a specter of tepid and unreliable 
U.S. unilateralism, and there is no reason to suppose that multilateral 
institutionalism holds the key to the resolution of the future brushfire 
ethnic conflicts sure to erupt in the post-post-Cold War European pe-
riphery now that Western institutional failures have "given heart to 
the wicked. "309 In the absence of the unholy bipolar balance of terror, 
these peripheral crises may prove much more intractable than previ-
309 MOUSA\'IZADEH, supm note 83, at 196. 
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ously has been the case. Whereas throughout the Cold War the inter-
national system was governed by elements of predictability and the 
behavior of the superpowers was constrained by a tacit code which 
emphasized communication, restraint, and flexibility to stave off nu-
clear holocaust, in the more multipolar contemporary world where 
threats are more diffused but less intense, the need to cooperate in 
order to survive is neither so axiomatic nor so obvious. Without a new 
bogeyman to which all simultaneously agree to transfer their defen-
sive orientation, collective Western European defense institutions in-
creasingly will assume the mantle and trappings of anachronism.3Io In 
the post-Cold War Balkans, the Alliance shamefully sacrificed military 
strategy and even the most fleeting and cursory considerations of jus-
tice to a lowest-common-denominator consensus, cowering behind 
bland and oblique formulations so as not to offend the sensitivities of 
its enemies.311 Many observers believe that if NATO did not exist to-
day, it would not be created-as the disasters in the Balkans illustrate, 
bipolar collective defense institutions are structurally incompatible 
with the practical as well as the moral catechism undergirding the 
management of the post-post-Cold War international system. 
Under its current governance, the ethos of Roosevelt and Reagan 
has been doused with the sand of multilateral institutionalism and the 
U.S. has absolutely no strategy and no idea when to intervene, what 
resources to employ, or what vital interests to secure. So long as 
Americans are misled into believing "it's the economy, stupid," inat-
tention to foreign policy will continue to hobble any attempt to resus-
citate U.S. leadership, scholarship, and responsibility. Further, al-
though due to its politico-economic exhaustion Russia cannot 
threaten a ground assault on Western Europe, to the extent the U.S. 
engages in foreign policy analysis, it is obsessed with the Kissingerian, 
Cold War-influenced notion that the fin de siecle represents a crux in 
world history in which preventing the return of imperial Russia is 
worth any price,3I2 even the unforced abandonment of Western prin-
ciples of truth, justice, and liberty via the maintenance of the destruc-
tive fiction of a U.S.-Russian partnership in the preservation of Euro-
pean security. While the U.S. retains overwhelming military power, 
not only does its relative economic decline deprive it of the resources 
to respond to every security and humanitarian emergency around the 
310 See CHRISTIE, slt/na note 32, at 223. 
3ll Richard Pede, The Continuing Threat. in EUROPE AND AMERICA BEYOND 2000, supra 
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globe,313 but it also lacks even the political or moral will to defend its 
core values by positively shaping the critical post-Communist transi-
tion in Europe. Yugoslavia was the indirect forum wherein to deter-
mine the future dynamics of post-Cold War European collective secu-
rity and, in particular, the role of the U.S. With its mishandling of the 
crisis 
[t] he U.S .... betrayed almost every principle that it claimed 
its domestic and foreign policy values were based upon .... 
[B]y standing by and watching the subjugation of the Bos-
nian Muslims [and now the Kosovar Albanians], the clear 
message has been sent out to every aspiring despot that 
there is no new world order and that the use of force will not 
necessarily be challenged.314 
Although Benjamin Franklin understood that in the "clash ... 
between Civilization and barbarism" Europe and America, the 
''world's great civilizations ... will ... hang together or hang sepa-
rately,"315 and although "[m]any Americans feel, with some 
justification, that, during the two world wars, their participation and 
that of their forefathers who rest in European cemeteries have earned 
them a permanent voice in European affairs,"316 an economic revolu-
tion born of the end of the Cold War is altering some of the economic 
interests which bound the U.S. and Europe, and selfish domestic con-
cerns predominate over military cooperation on both sides of the At-
lantic. 
[I]t was one thing for the U.S. to commit to, and spend 
heavily on, European defense to combat an evil empire 
whose forces were in the center of Europe; it is another to 
commit to allaying European uncertainties .... [O]ur 
presence creates an incentive for the Europeans to do 
less .... [T]he forces and money that we allocate to Europe 
might hurt our ability to deal with challenges elsewhere.317 
The cardinal assumption underlying the Alliance-that a wide-
spread agreement on the nature and severity of out-of-area threats as 
well as a functional consensus on how to address these threats would 
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survive the fall of the Berlin Wall-has been falsified by Yugoslavia. 
Although U.S. ambivalence toward the emergence of a European 
challenge to its leadership of Western European collective security 
through NATO was responsible in part for the Balkan holocaust, 
Europeans much more than Americans bore the brunt of the failure 
of the balance of power twice this century. If the U.S. has elected to 
shrug off the heavy responsibilities of its superpower mantle in lieu of 
its old national security blanket, isolationism, Europeans are not un-
wise to heed their uncomfortable yet didactic history and accelerate a 
decades-long effort to redefine their collective security imperatives 
and devise institutional architecture to one day independently secure 
these distinctly European ends. In an era where a drift from universal 
security and norms augurs the growing salience of regional foci and 
institutions, if indeed there is to be collective security, Europe cannot 
continue turning to external powers for help lest its call either go un-
answered or go answered by hostile parties dressed up as allies. Irre-
spective of whether the European push for independence alienates 
the U.S. or damages the Alliance, such will be the necessary price for 
the creation of an effective, reliable, post-post-Cold War European 
regional security institution. 
No number of high-level summits or lofty declarations can substi-
tute for the lack of common cause and political fortitude. Even if the 
EU is serious about achieving commonality as to the definition of se-
curity at the supranational level sufficient to create a vision of a peace-
time CFSP operating in synch with a theoretical notion of ESDI, the 
drive for independence must be commensurate with the will to gen-
erate the capabilities necessary to exercise it responsibly. Any security 
institution that lacks military capabilities and the willingness to use 
them in pursuit of its objectives will be useless the next time the guns 
begin to roar and the lamps begin to go out all over some corner of 
the European hinterland. The attainment of international peace and 
justice requires the allocation of major capabilities and the willingness 
to make sacrifices of other objectives. While the WEU ably housed 
efforts to develop an ESDI during the Cold War twilight, provided 
outreach to the East, and served as the visible expression of the Euro-
pean commitment to NATO, by the early 1990s it was apparent that 
without increased political, military, and financial commitments from 
Western European governments, the WEU never would become more 
than a political expedient to deflect burden sharing criticisms while 
the U.S. defended Western Europe. With each humbling failure in 
response to a regional crisis, the WEU has survived not through com-
plete institutional overhaul but by trumpeting its modest improve-
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ments in paper commitments and logistical procedures.3IS Should the 
U.S. recommit to Europe and the UN, the ever-vacillating EU ulti-
mately may decide to retreat from Cologne, arrest the incorporation 
of the WEU, and revive multilateralism by buttressing European de-
fense and security on complementary levels whereby the UN, OSCE, 
NATO, and the WEU, with their specific competencies clearly 
defined, would coexist and cooperate on the basis of the interlocking 
institutions paradigm.319 Similarly, political stagnation or a change of 
heart may yet deprive the WEU of the clear political mission, the clear 
chain of command and control, and the operational means to corre-
spond to the limits of potential future needs on the ground which it 
presently lacks.320 Furthermore, another pendular swing in the politi-
cal moods of the domestic electorates may usher a more nationalist or 
rilOre Atlanticist philosophy as to security back onto the European 
stage. Regardless, should Western Europeans nevertheless act upon 
their cyclical and overblown optimism and institutional faith and 
charge past NATO to hang their hats upon the vVEU without enhanc-
ing their own capabilities, the WEU, with the next major crisis, will 
become a martyr to the process of European integration, and the 
good it has accomplished likely will be interred with the bones of its 
soldiers in some foreign Golgotha. 
Ultimately, although a catena of treaties, declarations, and sum-
mits attests to the enduring desire to subordinate nationalist and 
ideological rivalries to a supranational European defense institution 
which alone can exert constructive leverage on the major detenni-
nants of pan-European security problems in the absence of U.S. he-
gemony, no amount of tinkering about the edges of extant European 
security institutions will suffice. If the past is prologue, nothing sug-
gests that any ambitious integrative project is within the grasp of the 
divided states of United Europe which, despite the end of the Cold 
War, are not yet post-sovereign. Although Western Europe finally has 
emerged from chaos to create a more intimate gathering of states 
which have managed to live for a half-century without the pervasive 
Hobbesian fear that any of them would use military force in relation 
to one another, the classical issues of security and war remain central 
to the divergent calculi of the individual states comprising the EU. 
The unwillingness of the critical triumvirate to define common politi-
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cal and security interests to underpin combined operations has pre-
vented the increasingly heterogeneous and neutral EU from acquir-
ing international personality despite its success in fostering a high de-
gree of economic integration. Unlike lower-order issues where 
divergence and dissent are not categorically proscribed in the interest 
of system stability, common defense is "deadly serious: it must be a 
matter of deeds, not words, of deep reaching solidarity, and not sim-
ply the highest common denominator. "321 With the recession of the 
Soviet threat, the motivation of Member States to continue in inter-
dependent foreign policy and military relationships and make the 
expenditures necessary to bolster national forces is going the way of 
the Berlin Wall,322 While much is made of the historical, cultural, and 
civilizational ties which bind the Member States and recommend a 
collective normative vision of international order,323 cooperation in 
security policy "comes through hard-won experience, including 
shared failures; it cannot be bought off the shelf. "324 
The EU has been categorically unable to abandon state sover-
eignty and culture and bury institutional and intra-European rivalries 
which prevent emergence of a common security and foreign policy 
climate that must precede the generation and endowment of a func-
tional supranational European defense organization capable of man-
aging genocidal ethno-nationalist crises in its periphery. This failure 
portends ill for the future, for although the bombast still echoes in 
Cologne, leftist governments will find it impossible to deliver both 
guns and butter. The problem is not a question of drafting the proper 
treaty or spending enough on defense or revising decisional proce-
dures. Rather, the dilemma facing the EU is an existential one: 
Europe must decide what it wants to be when it grows up, and it must 
decide quickly. Unless the EU summons the strength to cut through a 
confluence of contrary political, economic, legal, and social forces 
and create by treaty a robust executive with the courage and means to 
privilege defense over social welfare, European foreign policy will re-
main the jejune, disjointed sum of the policies of its increasingly neu-
tral and narcissistic individual states, while the EU, "still a civilian 
power whether it wishes to be or not" and "unable to shape the world 
321 David Heathcoat-Amory. The Next Step Jar Hbtern Ellropean lInion: A Blitish View, 
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in which it lives"325 no matter how much economic integration it fa-
cilitates, will risk becoming a pawn of external actors and spectator in 
a time of great danger and evil on its own continent. If this transpires, 
far from constituting a new pole in the world system, the EV will dis-
cover to its dismay that the policy instruments of a trading club are 
useless and, with military force the sole available option, its members, 
like the tragic Scot MacBeth, lack the "spur to prick the sides of 
[their] intent." 
It is important to note that the vow taken by so many upon learn-
ing of European genocide during World War II, "[n]ever again," has 
been defiled by the largely unopposed repetition of the ghastly phe-
nomenon a scant fifty years later. Nothing relative to post-post-Cold 
War European security is absolutely predetermined, and it is "banal to 
conclude that the ... future will evolve in a manner largely inde-
pendent of our wishes and designs. "326 Although the task ahead is 
fraught with hardship and "outcomes depend for their achievement 
on precise cOl~unctions of procedures, men, and issues, "327 Europe 
simply cannot throw up its hands in defeat and count upon the de-
clining V.S. to save it from itself. Vnless future generations of Euro-
peans are content to suffer the horror and ignominy of continental 
genocides in silence, they must insist that the EV begin at once to 
conduct itself as the Vnited States of Europe rather than as Europe's 
new sick man. 
POST SCRIPT 
At the Helsinki Meeting of the Council of the EV in December 
1999, the EV Member States adopted a Headline Goal which commit-
ted national militaries to endow the EV with the capacity, by 2003; to 
deploy and sustain a European force in support of future Petersberg 
operations where NATO as a whole elected not to engage.328 Al-
though in Helsinki the Europeans continued to assert that ESDI rep-
resented a capable and effective European pillar, an intellectual posi-
tion buttressed by tlle merger of the roles of EV High Representative 
for CFSP and Secretary General of the WEV in the person of Dr. 
Javier Solana, Member States were quick to differentiate the Headline 
Goal from any genuine effort at defense independence of NATO: the 
325 COKER, supra note 72, at 24-25. 
326 ROBERT W. TUCKER, THE INEQUALITY OF NATIONS 201 (1977). 
327 Treverton, supra note 23, at I. 
328 NATO Fact Sheet, The European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), available at 
http://W\\w.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/ esdLhtm (on file with author). 
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Headline Goal excludes an "unnecessary duplication" of NATO struc-
tures and explicitly rejects the creation of a European Army, while 
NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson stressed that "more 
Europe" will not lead to "less NATO."329 Although the WEU and 
NATO recently have begun to converge institutional and policy 
frameworks in theory33o and plan to prepare for a more coordinated, 
robust, and effective response to future out-of-area crises,331 tlle anvil 
upon which hopes for a better future remain to be forged-or bro-
ken-remains the willingness of the Europeans to commit the re-
sources, political and financial, to build the sort of force structure ca-
pable of deterring or defeating future foes. As Lord Robertson, 
Secretary General of NATO, cautions, 
[T]o maintain NATO's credibility, we need effective 
forces. . .. It means air forces and navies with precision 
guided munitions. It means command and control systems 
that allow for efficient and effective operations. It means 
forces that can move fast, hit hard and then stay in the field 
for as long as necessary. And it means that these capabilities 
are shared across the Alliance, not just in one or two of the 
most advanced members. Developing these capabilities takes 
money .... 332 
In an era when U.S. military commitments to Europe are less broad 
and deep than in the past and when the historical analogies of Bosnia 
and Kosovo are available to potential malcreants in Central and East-
ern Europe, whether the Europeans can summon the will to fund, 
train, equip, task, and deploy their military forces in response to 
egregious violations of human rights in their backyard well may be 
dispositive of whether, in fact, future Bosnias are like buses in that one 
will always be coming down the street. 
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